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  WHY THE GOOGLE BOOKS SETTLEMENT 
IS PROCOMPETITIVE 
 Einer  Elhauge 
1  
ABSTRACT
  Although the Google Books Settlement has been criticized as anticompetitive, 
I conclude that this critique is mistaken. For out-of-copyright books, the settle-
ment procompetitively expands output by clarifying which books are in the pub-
lic domain and making them digitally available for free. For claimed in-copyright 
books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by clarifying who holds 
their rights, making them digitally searchable, allowing individual digital display 
and sales at competitive prices each rightsholder can set, and creating a new sub-
scription product that provides digital access to a near-universal library at free or 
competitive rates. For unclaimed in-copyright books, the settlement procompeti-
tively expands output by helping to identify rightsholders and making their books 
saleable at competitive rates when they cannot be found. The settlement does not 
raise rival barriers to offering any of these books, but to the contrary lowers them. 
The output expansion is particularly dramatic for commercially unavailable books, 
which by deﬁ  nition would otherwise have no new output.  
  JEL Codes: K21, L12, L40, L41, L42, L49. 
  Keywords: Google, Books, Google Books, Google Books Settlement, Copy-
right, Digital Books, cartel, monopoly, monopolization, orphan books, out-of-
copyright, out-of-print, entry barriers, restraints of trade, Internet, antitrust. 
  1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
  The Google Books settlement gives Google default rights to digitize and 
make searchable all books published before January 5, 2009, and to display 
and sell digital versions of all commercially unavailable books, unless the 
book rightsholder chooses otherwise. This settlement has been criticized 
by those who argue that it creates an effective cartel among rightsholders 
1      Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law. I am grateful for extraordinarily able assistance from 
Mitchell Reich, for comments from the anonymous peer reviewer, and for research support 
from Google, Inc. The conclusions here are mine, not theirs, and should also not be taken to 
reﬂ  ect the views of Harvard University.   
 
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
4
,
 
2
0
1
3
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 2 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
and a de facto monopoly over digital sales of commercially unavailable 
books. However, I conclude these antitrust critiques are mistaken. The 
settlement procompetitively increases book output by expanding unfet-
tered competition in book licensing and reducing legal and logistical bar-
riers to their distribution by both Google and its rivals. In short, it has 
no anticompetitive effects and dramatic procompetitive effects, including 
resurrecting a treasure trove of intellectual heritage that would otherwise 
largely be lost and making books more easily accessible to more persons 
than they ever have been in history.  My analysis throughout will be of 
the Amended Settlement Agreement that is currently pending. Because 
the analysis is complex, I begin by summarizing my conclusions for each 
category of books. 
  Out-of-Copyright Books.  Because the settlement only governs in- copyright 
books, one might mistakenly think it does not affect out-of-print books. 
But it does. Currently, uncertainty about whether a book is out of copy-
right deters ﬁ  rms from offering many books that are actually out of 
  copyright. The settlement has provisions that create and fund a process 
to clarify which books are actually out of copyright, thus expanding the 
number of books that are effectively in the public domain and allowing 
Google to add them to the books that are fully searchable and available for 
free downloading online. This procompetitively expands output by taking 
a set of books that previously were impossible or costly to ﬁ  nd or own and 
making them easy and free to ﬁ  nd and own. The settlement imposes no 
barrier for Google rivals who wish to distribute these books. To the con-
trary, it afﬁ  rmatively lowers those barriers because the settlement allows 
rivals to free ride on Google’s costs of digitizing those books and clari-
ﬁ  es which books are in the public domain. The expanded availability of 
free out-of-copyright books should also put downward pressure on used-
book prices for these books and to some extent on licenses and prices for 
 in-copyright  books. 
  Commercially Available Books.   The settlement procompetitively provides 
a process for making decisions in the face of uncertainty about who owns 
digital rights to commercially available books, thus easing the digital licens-
ing of these books and increasing the output of digital commercially avail-
able books. The settlement also expands the sales of commercially available 
books by making them searchable on Google and directing searchers to 
the ﬁ  rms that sell them, thus helping buyers locate the books they want 
to buy, whether in printed or digital form. Finally, the settlement provides 
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an additional nonexclusive vehicle for promoting commercially available 
books, allowing rightsholders to choose to have Google display and sell 
their books at a price each individual rightsholder can individually set, 
which economic analysis indicates would create enormous beneﬁ  ts to con-
sumer welfare. The settlement imposes no barrier to digital distribution of 
these books by Google rivals, which can distribute these same books if the 
rightsholders want at any price they wish, and indeed lowers barriers to 
Google rivals by providing information on how much digital demand there 
is for each book. 
    In-Copyright Books That Are Commercially Unavailable.   The settlement also 
procompetitively expands sales of books that are in copyright but commer-
cially unavailable. The settlement deﬁ  nes a “commercially available” book 
as any in-copyright book (digital or not, as long as any digital copy was not 
obtained from Google’s scanning project) that some seller offers for sale 
new, at the future time in question. 
2  Thus, a commercially unavailable book 
is by deﬁ  nition a book for which there would be zero new output unless the 
settlement allows Google to offer its scanned books for sale. The settlement 
makes all these commercially unavailable in-copyright books by default 
searchable and available for preview and sale on Google. This creates addi-
tional output that otherwise would be nonexistent and vastly increases the 
availability of these books, which otherwise would be limited to those who 
can ﬁ  nd them for resale on the used-book market or for loan from a library. 
The settlement also increases the number of these books whose rightsh-
olders would be known by clarifying whether authors or publishers own 
their rights, creating a Book Rights Registry funded to locate rightsholders, 
and paying royalties to registered rightsholders that incentivize unknown 
rightsholders to come forward. This increase in known rightsholders will 
increase licensing competition and further increase the output of digital 
books, whether through Google or its rivals.  
  Competition among books that are claimed by rightsholders is entirely 
unrestrained, because any rightsholder can set its own book price for sale 
2       Amended Settlement Agreement §1.31,   Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05 
CV 8136-DC (Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter “Amended Settlement”] (“‘Commercially Available’ 
means . . . that the Rightsholder . . . is, at the time in question, offering the Book (other than as 
derived from a Library Scan) for sale new, from sellers anywhere in the world, through one or 
more then-customary channels of trade into purchasers within the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom or Australia.”); §1.19 (deﬁ  ning “Book” to exclude “work in, or as they become 
in, the public domain”); §1.81 (deﬁ  ning a “Library Scan” as a digitized copy obtained through 
the Google’s scanning project).   
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 4 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
through Google and remains free to sell its books through any Google rival. 
For a commercially unavailable book that has a rightsholder who elects not 
to set a price or who is unknown, the settlement requires Google to set a 
price using an algorithm designed to mimic competitive pricing. Google 
has ample incentives to follow this algorithm faithfully because low book 
prices would increase its web trafﬁ  c and revenue from advertising (which 
provides 97 percent of Google’s revenue), and in any event any effort to set 
a supracompetitive price would be constrained because known rightshold-
ers would have incentives to undercut it. Although unknown rightshold-
ers by deﬁ  nition cannot set prices for their unclaimed books, 
3   prices for 
unclaimed books would also be constrained by the settlement algorithm, 
by Google’s incentives not to sacriﬁ  ce advertising revenue, by competition 
from claimed books, and by the fact that any supracompetitive price would 
incentivize unknown rightsholders to identify themselves. In any event, un-
claimed books would by deﬁ  nition be unlicensable absent the settlement, 
making the but-for price for new output of unclaimed books effectively 
inﬁ  nity, so that the settlement can only lower their price and expand their 
output. Further, by lowering the number of unclaimed books, the settle-
ment lowers the number of books with this effectively inﬁ  nite but-for price 
on new output. 
  Nothing in the settlement impairs the ability of Google rivals to offer 
in-copyright books that are commercially unavailable. There are barriers 
to offering such books, but they are created by the costs of digitizing these 
books, the transaction costs of locating and negotiating with rightshold-
ers, and the risk-bearing costs of situations where rights or their value are 
unclear or unknown. The settlement overcomes these barriers to entry for 
Google without raising them for any rival because every right the settle-
ment gives Google is expressly nonexclusive. Far from increasing rival entry 
barriers, the settlement afﬁ  rmatively lowers rival transaction and risk-bearing 
costs in a number of ways. First, the settlement helps rivals value digital 
books by revealing the extent of buyer demand for them, thus helping rivals 
decide which books to license for digital use. Second, the settlement creates 
3      I will use the term “unclaimed books” rather than “orphan books” to refer to books with un-
known rightsholders because the term “orphan books” is misleading. Orphans have no parents, 
whereas so-called orphan books have rightsholders whose identity or location is unknown. 
(If they had no rightsholder, they would be out of copyright and thus pose no issue.) Because 
a key beneﬁ  t of the settlement is converting unknown rightsholders into known rightsholders, 
it is clearer to refer to these books as “unclaimed books.”   
 
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
4
,
 
2
0
1
3
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 Spring 2010: Volume 2, Number 1  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  5  
a public database of rightsholders in claimed books that lowers rival costs 
in identifying and contacting them. Third, the settlement funds a search for 
rightsholders of unclaimed books, allowing rivals to avoid the transaction 
costs of ﬁ  nding them or the risks of offering unclaimed books without a 
license. 
  Indeed, the settlement may lower rival entry barriers even further be-
cause it allows licensing to Google rivals of claimed books by the Registry 
and of unclaimed books by the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary “to the extent 
permitted by law.” 
4   This raises two possibilities, depending on what one 
thinks the law permits a class action settlement to cover. If a class action 
settlement can legally authorize the Registry and Fiduciary to grant Google 
rivals the same default licenses over commercially unavailable books that 
Google gets under the settlement, then the settlement grants that author-
ity. The Registry and Fiduciary have every incentive to exercise whatever 
licensing authority they have to get better distribution or a lower distribu-
tion markup. Such a settlement-created licensing authority would thus dra-
matically lower rival barriers to entry and create full competition in digital 
distribution of commercially unavailable books. If the settlement cannot 
legally give the Registry and Fiduciary authority over default licensing, then 
the settlement grants authority to license Google rivals only to the extent 
that the Registry gets post-settlement authority from the rightsholders to 
do so. This still lowers rival barriers to entry because the Registry has in-
centives to collect licenses and relicense them in aggregate form to improve 
distribution or lower markups. Whatever one’s conclusion of what is “per-
mitted by law,” the settlement by deﬁ  nition did all it legally could to allow 
licensing of Google rivals. 
  In contrast, barring the settlement would anticompetitively raise entry 
barriers to prohibitive levels for Google and any other ﬁ  rm hoping to distrib-
ute books that are in copyright but commercially unavailable. Absent a class 
action settlement, the transaction and risk-bearing costs created by copyright 
law would be too high to distribute these books, resulting in zero output. A 
holding that such a settlement violates antitrust law would not only prevent 
Google from overcoming these entry barriers, but set a precedent preventing 
any rival from overcoming them either, condemning us all to zero output of 
these books and an effective price of inﬁ  nity for new copies of them. 
4    Amended  Settlement  §6.2(b)(i).  
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 6 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
    Institutional Subscriptions to All Google Books.   The settlement also creates a 
brand new product, the institutional subscription, which gives institutions 
the ability to fully view all commercially unavailable books that are avail-
able for purchase under the settlement and all commercially available books 
whose rightsholders elect to include them in the subscription. This sort of 
blanket license is totally unfeasible today, and adding a market option that 
otherwise would not exist can only be procompetitive. Google must pro-
vide this institutional subscription for free at one or more terminals per 
college or public library. For other institutions, the settlement requires that 
subscription fees be set to earn only competitive market rates and to ensure 
the sort of broad access that would exist with competitive market output. 
Further, any ability to set supracompetitive prices for institutional subscrip-
tions would be constrained by competition with other book sources (which 
the settlement enhances) and by Google’s incentives to keep the price low to 
increase the advertising revenue that provides 97 percent of its current rev-
enue. Nor does the settlement in any way increase the barriers that Google 
rivals might face in offering similar institutional subscriptions. To the con-
trary, it lowers those barriers for the same reasons described above for all 
books, whether commercially available or unavailable. 
  Other  Procompetitive  Beneﬁ  ts.   The Settlement also provides a sundry of 
other powerful procompetitive beneﬁ  ts. It makes all displayed books avail-
able to the 15–30 million print-disabled Americans, who currently can ac-
cess only a small subset of these books. It creates a digitized database of 
almost all books, which researchers can use to conduct research in linguis-
tics, translation, or search protocols that currently would be impossible. 
It encourages a digitization of books that protects against books getting 
damaged or lost to history. Finally, it dramatically aids general research by 
making the bulk of past published books available online for free search, 
free preview, and free or lower cost purchase, thus curing the unfortunate 
tendency of current research to unduly favor less-developed, more-recent 
works because of their greater online availability. 
  Precedent.   The settlement compares favorably to the blanket licenses for 
copyrighted songs that the opinions in   BMI    v. CBS   held were too procom-
petitive to be subject to the per se rule and too lacking in anticompetitive 
effect to violate the rule of reason. There, as here, transaction costs made 
direct licensing with many rightsholders costly, and the agreements cre-
ated an intermediary that offered a blanket license covering all their works 
but left individual rightsholders free to license directly. The Supreme Court 
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concluded that lowering transaction costs and creating the new product of 
a blanket license were procompetitive justiﬁ  cations that made the per se 
rule inapplicable, and the lower appellate court concluded that the ability 
to directly license with individual rightsholders eliminated any anticom-
petitive effect. The same logic is equally applicable here, with the difference 
that the settlement is even less restraining in multiple respects. First, the 
  BMI   intermediary offered blanket licenses but not individual songs, and 
the plaintiff sought the remedy of requiring individual song sales. In con-
trast, the settlement requires Google to offer books on both a blanket and 
individual basis, and thus already provides the very market option of single 
sales that the   BMI   plaintiff sought as a remedy. Second, the   BMI   rightsh-
olders could not set their own prices for sales through the intermediary, 
whereas the settlement allows rightsholders to set their own prices for sales 
through Google. Third, the   BMI   rightsholders could not license the same 
song through a rival intermediary, whereas the settlement allows rightsh-
olders to license their books for distribution through any Google rival and 
Google at the same time. Thus, given that the   BMI   agreement was neither 
per se     illegal nor a rule of reason violation, the Google books settlement 
cannot violate antitrust law either. 
  2. ENTRY BARRIERS AND THE BUT-FOR BASELINE 
  Understanding the effects of the Google books settlement requires ﬁ  rst un-
derstanding what the but-for world would look like without the challenged 
settlement provisions. Nothing in the settlement in any way diminishes 
the ability of any Google rival to compete in distributing digital books. 
True, there are obstacles to doing so, but they are not obstacles imposed by 
the settlement. Instead, they are obstacles imposed by digitization costs and 
the transaction and risk-bearing costs of ascertaining which books are in 
copyright, determining who holds any rights, locating rightsholders, and 
negotiating an agreement. Because every right that the settlement gives 
Google to digitize, display, or sell books is expressly non-exclusive, 
5   the 
5      Amended Settlement §2.4 (“The authorizations granted to Google in this Amended Settle-
ment Agreement are non-exclusive only, and nothing in this Amended Settlement Agreement 
shall be construed as limiting any Rightsholder’s right to authorize, through the Registry or 
otherwise, any Person, including direct competitors of Google, to use his, her or its Books or 
Inserts in any way, including ways identical to those provided for under this Amended Settle-
ment Agreement.”);   see also   §3.1(a) (Google’s digitization rights are “non-exclusive”).    
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 8 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
settlement in no way increases the barriers to entry imposed by these costs. 
To the contrary, the settlement reduces barriers to entry for any Google 
rival in several ways detailed below. Critics argue that the settlement does 
not lower entry barriers enough for rivals to provide the commercially un-
available books that Google will be able to provide. This claim is, we shall 
see, factually debatable. Moreover, if true, this claim would mean that rivals 
would be even less likely to offer these books in the but-for world where the 
settlement didn’t lower those entry barriers somewhat. Disapproval of this 
settlement would thus, if critics are right, result in a but-for world where no 
one offers these commercially unavailable books, which is certainly worse 
than a world where Google alone offers them, especially given that the set-
tlement commits to competitive pricing.  
  2.1. How the Settlement Lowers Entry Barriers 
  Lower Digitization Cost Barriers.   Google has incurred the enormous cost 
of digitizing the books, which included labor costs, signiﬁ  cant legal risk, 
and creating new technologies to automate scanning and deal with book 
page curvature (Harrington 2009; Clements 2009). The settlement allows 
Google to provide each fully participating library with a digital copy of its 
books. 
6   Those libraries are in turn free to sell those digital books to any 
Google rival if they are out of copyright. In fact, the University of Michigan 
has already used its digitized books to enter into an agreement to sell print-
on-demand access to hundreds of thousands of its out-of-copyright books 
through Amazon.com (Gershman 2009). Thus, Google rivals can free ride 
on Google’s digitization without incurring those digitization costs when 
selling any out-of-copyright books. Facing this prospect, Google itself has 
proven willing to provide its digitized collection of public domain books to 
rival distributors: Sony and Barnes & Noble have entered into agreements 
with Google to each market more than 500,000 out-of-copyright books 
that Google digitized (Stone 2009; Rich 2009). As time goes on, more and 
6      Google can give “fully participating libraries” digital copies of all its books that Google digi-
tized and even its books that Google digitized from other sources as long as a substantial 
portion of the library books were digitized.   See   Amended Settlement §7.2(a). What makes a 
library “fully participating” is that it has not only agreed to have its books digitized but also 
agreed to conditions limiting the use of those digitized copies. Amended Settlement §§ 1.62, 
7.1, 7.2.  “Cooperating libraries,” in contrast, have allowed digitization of their books but have 
not agreed to the same conditions limiting use of those digitized copies, and thus do not re-
ceive those digital copies. Amended Settlement §1.39.   
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more of the books that Google digitized will go out of copyright and thus 
become available to rivals without incurring digitization costs.  
 Further, the settlement makes the entire corpus of digitized books avail-
able for nonconsumptive research. 
7   The settlement limits this availability 
to “qualiﬁ  ed users,” which is deﬁ  ned to include universities, nonproﬁ  ts, 
government agencies, and others who agree to abide by limits on con-
sumptive or commercial usage. 
8   Although the settlement thus does limit 
the sorts of research or commercial usage that can be made of the digitized 
corpus that Google paid to create, the “non-consumptive research” that 
the settlement permits is deﬁ  ned to include developing improved search 
algorithms, and the settlement expressly provides that “Commercial ex-
ploitation of algorithms developed when performing Non-Consumptive 
Research on the Research Corpus is permitted.” 
9   Thus, the settlement al-
lows others to free ride on Google’s creation of this research corpus by 
using it to discover superior search algorithms for use by rival commercial 
search engines. 
    Lower Costs to Valuing Digital Books.   The settlement also lowers the bar-
riers to rivals offering digital versions of any books by providing useful in-
formation about the extent of commercial value each book might have in 
digital form. Google rivals can easily free ride on this information by seeing 
the display price and asking rightsholders about their sales volume. They 
can then use this information to offer books only when their commercial 
value makes doing so proﬁ  table given any digitization, transaction, royalty, 
and distribution costs.  
  Lower Costs to Identifying Out-of-Copyright Books.   The settlement agree-
ment lowers the barriers for rivals offering out-of-copyright books by 
clarifying which books are in the public domain. Currently, books pub-
lished in the United States between 1923 and 1963 are in copyright only if 
the copyright was both noticed in the publication and properly renewed 
(Hirtle 2010). It is costly to resolve when these tests are met, especially be-
cause the renewal records were not digitized and because the average value 
of these books can be slight compared to these costs and the risk of tens 
of thousands of   dollars of statutory damages for mistakenly replicating a 
7    Amended  Settlement  §7.2(d).  
8      Amended Settlement §§ 1.123, 7.2(d)(iii), (vi).   
9      Amended Settlement §§1.93(e), 7.2(d)(x).   
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 10 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
copyrighted book. 
10   Thus, many books in this time frame have not been 
offered by Google or others, even though 93 percent are actually out of 
copyright (Ringer 1961, 220). 
11   The settlement lowers these costs and risks 
by providing a process for determining which books are out of copyright 
that is binding on rightsholders and funded by Google and the Registry. 
12  
Because the settlement makes this information publicly available, rivals can 
free ride on it to offer all out-of-copyright books without incurring similar 
costs and risks. 
13  
    Lower Costs to Offering In-Copyright Books That Are Commercially Un-
available.   The settlement also lowers the barriers to rival efforts to offer 
in-copyright books that are commercially unavailable    First,   the settlement 
lowers   rival costs of identifying who holds the rights to commercially un-
available books that are in copyright. It does so in two ways: (1) The set-
tlement provides and funds a mechanism for resolving reversion issues. 
14  
Today, when a publisher allows a book to go out of print, it is often unclear 
whether the rights have reverted to the author. Resolving this issue thus 
lowers the costs of identifying who holds the rights even when the possible 
rightsholders are known. (2) Even when the reversion issue is clear, it takes 
effort to identify the author or publisher or their successors in interest. 
15  
Many are  unknown, which is the problem of unclaimed (orphan) books. The 
settlement   incentivizes unknown rightsholders to identify themselves by 
giving them royalties if they register. The settlement also funds a Registry 
10      Under the Copyright Act, rightholders can choose between (1) actual damages plus the in-
fringer’s proﬁ  ts or (2) statutory damages per infringed book of up to $150,000 if the infringe-
ment was willful or $30,000 if it was not. 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1).    
11      Ringer found that fewer than 7 percent of registered book copyrights were renewed.   
12      Amended Settlement §3.2(d)(v) & Attachment E.   
13      A book’s display status on Google presumptively indicates its status because out-of-copyright 
books are 100 percent displayed for free, whereas no more than 20 percent of in-copyright 
books will be freely displayed unless a registered rightsholder speciﬁ  es otherwise.  See  Amended 
Settlement §4.3(b)(i)(1). Further, the settlement provides that the Registry will make publicly 
available which books have registered rightsholders.    See    id.   §6.6(d). Thus, a rival can easily 
identify all the books that are out of copyright by taking the set of books that are 100 percent 
displayed by Google and subtracting any of these books that the Registry database indicates 
have registered rightsholders.   
14      Amended Settlement Attachment A, Article IV.   
15    U.S.  Copyright  Ofﬁ  ce 2006, 22–34 (rightsholders can be difﬁ  cult to identify because the book 
fails to identify the initial rightsholder, ownership has been transferred or the rightsholder has 
relocated, existing databases of copyright information are incomplete, and researching copy-
right information is difﬁ  cult, costly, and uncertain to succeed).   
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that is required to search for any unknown rightsholders who neglect to 
come forward. 
16   By thus identifying unknown rightsholders, the settlement 
will convert many unclaimed books into claimed books. 
  Rivals will be able to free ride on these costly efforts to resolve and locate 
rightsholders for commercially unavailable books because the settlement 
provides that the Registry will make publicly available a database that iden-
tiﬁ  es all registered rightsholders. 
17   Because the settlement will reduce the 
number of unclaimed books from current levels, it will lower the transaction 
costs for licensing this set of books from effectively inﬁ  nity to a potentially 
more feasible amount. 
  Second,   the settlement will lower the risk-bearing costs of selling un-
claimed books without a license. If these rightsholders have not come forward 
to register despite the settlement rewards for doing so, then that indicates 
they lack the knowledge, ability, or interest to claim their rights, thus low-
ering the risk that offering their books without a license would trigger a 
lawsuit.  
  Third,   the settlement lowers the costs for rivals to obtain rights for a 
broad range of commercially unavailable books similar to those obtained 
by Google. The settlement does so in four ways.  
  (1) Lowering Costs of Mass Offers by Google Rivals to Registered Rightsholders.  
The settlement’s creation of a public database of all registered rightsholders 
makes it much easier for rivals to make a mass offer directly to those rightsh-
olders. If the rival offer is more attractive than Google’s settlement terms, the 
rival should have no trouble getting many rightsholders to accept because the 
rightsholders can do so without giving up any rights to distribute via Google. 
True, this cannot help with unclaimed books. But because of the settlement, 
there will be far fewer unclaimed books, especially unclaimed books that have 
any signiﬁ  cant value, because the settlement incentivizes unknown rightsh-
olders to come forward and funds a Registry search for any that don’t. 
    (2) Authorizing Registry to Aggregate Rights and LicenseTthem to Google’s 
Rivals .   The settlement provides that: “The Registry will be organized on a 
16      Amended Settlement §6.1(c) (Registry “will use commercially reasonable efforts to locate 
Righstholders of Books and Inserts”). Google will pay $34.5 million to initially fund the Reg-
istry. §§ 5.2, 6.4. If rightsholders do not register, after ﬁ  ve years up to 25 percent of their un-
claimed royalties can be used to search for search for unclaimed rightsholders, and after ten 
years, their unclaimed royalties go to charities that advance literacy, education or freedom of 
expression and that beneﬁ  t rightsholders and the reading public. §6.3(a)(i).   
17      Amended Settlement §6.6(d).    
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 12 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
basis that allows the Registry . . . to . . ., . . . to the extent permitted by law, 
license Rightsholders’ U.S. copyrights to third parties.” 
18   At a minimum, 
this provision clearly allows the Registry to license books to Google rivals 
if the Registry gets subsequent rightsholder permission. Some critics argue 
that neither the Registry nor rightsholders would have incentives to license 
a Google rival (Picker 2009c, 408). But that is incorrect because they would 
have the same incentives to minimize the distribution markup that any up-
stream supplier has. 
19   Thus, if a Google rival would undercut the distribu-
tion markup that Google charges or be a more efﬁ  cient distributor in any 
other way, then both the Registry and individual rightsholders would have 
incentives to license that rival. Accordingly, the Registry would have incen-
tives to ask each registrant to authorize it to license rivals, each registrant 
would have incentives to give that authority, and the Registry could then 
license all authorized books in aggregate to any rival.  
    (3) Possibly Authorizing the Registry and Fiduciary to License Default Rights 
to Claimed and Unclaimed Books.   The settlement arguably provides an even 
lower cost way for rivals to obtain default rights to offer commercially un-
available books because the settlement allows the Registry to license claimed 
books, and the Fiduciary to license unclaimed books, “to the extent permit-
ted by law.” 
20   The effect of this provision depends on what one believes the 
law permits. Suppose one believes that the current class action settlement 
could not itself legally permit the Registry or Fiduciary to license Google’s 
rivals because there is no current case or controversy involving those ri-
vals. Then this provision means only that the settlement does not preclude 
the Registry and Fiduciary from licensing books to Google’s rivals, but 
the provision does not itself afﬁ  rmatively confer authority to grant such 
licenses. Such permission would instead have to be obtained either from 
the   rightsholders directly, from settlement of a second class action by the 
rightsholders against Google’s rivals, or from new legislation covering un-
claimed books. In that case, the settlement still lowers entry costs in all the 
ways noted above. Now suppose one instead believes that the rightsholders 
18      Amended Settlement 6.2(b)(i);   see also   §6.1(a).  
19     Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,   551 U.S. 877, 896 (2007) (“in general, the 
interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to retailer proﬁ  t margins. 
The difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and the price retailers charge 
consumers represents part of the manufacturer's cost of distribution, which, like any other 
cost, the manufacturer usually desires to minimize.”); Elhauge 2008b, 441–442.   
20    Amended  Settlement  §6.2(b)(i).  
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represented in the current class action could legally permit the Registry and 
Fiduciary to grant default licenses for their claimed and unclaimed books 
to Google’s rivals, perhaps on the theory that rival licenses are inextricably 
intertwined with the licenses to Google. Then this provision would seem to 
afﬁ  rmatively give the Registry and Fiduciary the power to license Google ri-
vals without requiring later rightsholder permission, as long as the relevant 
rightsholders did not object. In this case, the settlement lowers the barri-
ers for rivals even further, allowing rivals to get a default license similar to 
Google for all commercially unavailable books through agreements with the 
Registry and Fiduciary without incurring the costs of a class action at all.  
  In its initial Statement of Interest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) ten-
tatively dismissed this second possibility on the grounds that the parties 
represented to it that “they believe the Registry would lack the power and 
ability to license copyrighted books without the consent of the copyright 
owner.” 
21   But the views of Google and the class do not determine what the 
law actually permits. There are two possibilities. First, the parties might be 
incorrect in their prediction about what the law will permit. If so, then the 
provision does authorize the Registry and Fiduciary to grant default licens-
es to all commercially unavailable claimed or unclaimed books covered by 
the settlement. Second, the parties might be correct about what the law will 
permit. If so, then it is not the settlement agreement that is barring such 
licenses; it is the law that does not permit them. Either way, the settlement 
will have done all it legally could to authorize default licenses to rivals that 
parallel the default licenses the settlement grants to Google.  
    (4) Roadmap to Second Class Action.   Even if the above methods were 
deemed incomplete or ineffective, the settlement would still, if approved, 
lower rival entry barriers by providing a roadmap by which rivals could use 
a similar class action vehicle to obtain those rights. Rivals could simply en-
gage in copying efforts similar to Google, inviting a class action lawsuit that 
they would know (if this settlement were approved) they can settle on simi-
lar terms, perhaps with this settlement’s Registry and Fiduciary, perhaps 
with other class action representatives that agree to create a second com-
peting Registry and Fiduciary. If the second class action were controlled by 
the same forces who control the Registry and Fiduciary, they would have 
21      Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement 
at 23,   Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05 CV 8136-DC (Sept. 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter “Initial DOJ Brief”].   
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 14 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
incentives to license the rival in order to minimize Google’s distribution 
markup. If it were not, then the second set of class action plaintiffs would 
be competitors of the Registry and Fiduciary with even stronger incen-
tives to license a rival and undercut Google. If no class action were brought 
against the copying rivals, then the rivals would be even better off because 
they would be able to offer the same books as Google without incurring the 
same royalty costs. None of this is to deny that triggering a second class ac-
tion would incur serious entry costs. The point is that the settlement does 
nothing to raise those costs but to the contrary, if approved, would some-
what lower those costs by reducing the risk that courts might not approve 
a similar settlement by rivals. 
  2.2. The Critique of De Facto Monopoly and the Proper But-for-Baseline 
  Critics argue that these entry barriers will remain insuperable for Google’s 
rivals after the settlement because (1) outside of a second class action, it is 
impossible for rivals to get licenses for unclaimed books and infeasible to 
get simultaneous licenses over a comprehensive set of commercially unavail-
able claimed books; and (2) rivals would still regard a second class action 
as too costly and risky. The critics argue that this means the settlement will 
give Google a de   facto exclusive license and monopoly in offering unclaimed 
books and a comprehensive set of commercially unavailable books. 
22   In its 
initial brief, the DOJ indicated tentative support for this position, but relied 
partly on a most favored nation clause in the initial settlement that has been 
cut from the amended settlement. 
23   It remains to be seen whether the DOJ 
will stick to this position even now that, with the elimination of the most 
favored nation clause,   all   the remaining obstacles to rival entry that the DOJ 
cited refer to factors that were not created by the settlement and would exist 
without it. I myself think that the most favored nations clause was always 
a red herring, because no persuasive analysis was ever offered about why it 
would deter rival entry (Elhauge 2009c, 4–5, 39–41; 2009a, 7). But regard-
less of whether one thought it was a red herring, eliminating this clause has 
22      Amazon.com Objection to Proposed Settlement,   Authors Guild, Inc. v.Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. 
Case No. 05 CV 8136-DC, at 1 (Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter “Amazon Initial Brief”]; Yahoo! 
Objection to Proposed Settlement,   Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05 CV 
8136-DC, at 24–25 (Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter “Yahoo Initial Brief”]; Darnton 2009a; Fraser 
2009, 2; Grimmelman Amicus Brief,   Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05 CV 
8136-DC, at 9–10 (Sept. 3, 2009) [hereinafter “Grimmelmann Initial Brief”]; Grimmelmann 
2009b, 1, 11–20; Picker 2009c, 385–386; Samuelson 2009a; Gibson 2008, A21.   
23      Initial DOJ Brief at 23–24.   
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 usefully  clariﬁ  ed that the objections of many critics are based on entry ob-
stacles that would apply equally without the settlement, because these critics 
continue to object that the settlement creates a de facto exclusive license even 
though they can no longer point to any entry obstacle that was even arguably 
created or worsened by the settlement (Open Book Alliance 2009; Darnton 
2009b; Grimmelmann 2009a; Picker 2009b, 2–3; Samuelson 2009b). 
  The de facto exclusive license critique has several problems. To begin with, 
it relies on three factual premises that must all be right for the critic’s argu-
ment to work, and the accuracy of every one of them is debatable. (1) Perhaps 
the critics are right that the settlement cannot legally permit the Registry and 
Fiduciary to grant default licenses to Google’s rivals, but if they are wrong in 
that legal premise, then the settlement does directly authorize such licens-
ing. (2) Perhaps the critics are right that, absent Registry or Fiduciary licens-
ing, rivals could never assemble a competing near-universal library without 
a second class action. But it also seems plausible that under the settlement: 
(a) almost all currently unclaimed books that have signiﬁ  cant value would 
become claimed, and (b) rivals or the Registry could then assemble near-
universal libraries by getting permissions from rightsholders of claimed 
books. The former is plausible because of Registry search and rightsholders’ 
incentives to come forward, and the latter is plausible because the settlement 
greatly lowers the costs of identifying and contacting all claimed rightshold-
ers. (3) Perhaps the critics are right that rivals would be unwilling to engage 
in conduct similar to Google’s and risk triggering a second class action. But 
Google did so, and the risks of a rival doing so would only be lower if this 
settlement were approved because approval would resolve legal uncertainty 
about whether a similar rival settlement would get approved. Further, if the 
critics are right that the settlement would lead to monopoly pricing, then the 
rival gains from engaging in similar conduct would be high, higher than they 
were for Google, which probably never anticipated that digitizing books for 
snippet display in searches might trigger a class action settlement giving it 
default licensing rights to make proﬁ  table book sales. So if Google found the 
risk-reward tradeoff worth it despite a higher risk and less expected reward, 
one might think that a rival like Amazon, Microsoft, or Yahoo would also 
ﬁ  nd it worthwhile after an approved settlement lowered the risk and raised 
the expected rewards.  
  Obviously, any of these three strategies would put these rivals behind the 
ﬁ  rst-mover, Google, which is probably why these rivals have instead cho-
sen to oppose the settlement directly and through the Open Book Alliance. 
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 16 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
But a ﬁ  rst-mover advantage is not the same thing as a de facto monopoly, 
and the desire of rivals to avoid second-mover status is not grounds for 
 antitrust  invalidation. 
 In any event, we need not rest on disputed factual predictions, for what is 
even more interesting is that the critics’ argument fails conceptually even if 
we grant them the beneﬁ  t of each factual doubt. An assumption that critics 
are right on all their factual premises would not show that the   settlement  
forecloses rivals or confers a de facto exclusive license, for the obstacles to 
rival entry to which the critics point are not caused by the settlement, but 
instead reﬂ  ect independent entry barriers like transaction costs and copy-
right risks. The initial DOJ brief highlighted as much, concluding that 
“Google’s competitors are unlikely to be able to obtain comparable rights 
independently. They would face the same problems . . . that Google is seek-
ing to surmount through the Settlement Proposal.” 
24  In fact they would face 
lesser problems, not the “same problems,” because the settlement lowers 
rivals’ barriers in the ways described above, but assuming the DOJ is right 
that they would be the “same problems” only highlights that they are prob-
lems that the settlement seeks to surmount but did not create or worsen. 
Even if it turns out to be true that Google is the only ﬁ  rm that is willing or 
able to incur the costs and risks of a class action to trigger a settlement, that 
does not mean that the settlement forecloses anything or confers a de facto 
exclusive license. The foreclosure or de facto exclusivity would be provided 
by the unwillingness or inability of Google rivals to overcome entry barri-
ers that the settlement did not create (and in fact lowers). 
  More important, if critics are right in their factual premise that these 
entry barriers are insuperable without this sort of class action settlement, 
it means that the but-for alternative to this settlement is a world where 
  no   ﬁ rm offers either unclaimed books or a comprehensive set of commer-
cially unavailable books. In other words, the critics’ own premise conﬁ  rms 
that this settlement provides a powerful procompetitive beneﬁ  t—making 
24      Initial DOJ Brief at 23;   see also   Yahoo Initial Brief at 24 (“Although nothing in the Proposed 
Settlement expressly prohibits the entry of any other potential market participant into the ﬁ  eld 
of digital book scanning and searching, the structure of the Proposed Settlement ensures that 
the market is functionally closed to new entrants. Through the Proposed Settlement, Google 
has sidestepped the tremendously laborious process of negotiating with rights holders for indi-
vidually tailored licensing deals. Any would-be competitor attempting to negotiate directly with 
each rights holder would be faced with insurmountable transaction costs and impossibility: a 
potential competitor simply cannot negotiate with every rights holder covered by the Proposed 
Settlement because of the large percentage of those rights holders that cannot be found.”).   
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available books that could not be available without the settlement. 
25   Even 
if the critics are right that no Google rival could overcome the barriers 
to entry in a similar way, a market with one competitor is better than a 
market with none, because it increases market options and output from 
nothing to something, thus improving consumer welfare. If the critics are 
wrong, and other rivals can overcome the same entry barriers (perhaps 
because the settlement lowers them), then the settlement is even more 
  procompetitive—creating a competitive market in digital distribution of a 
set of books that otherwise would not be offered at all. 
   Any ruling that antitrust law bars the sort of class action resolution pro-
posed here would not reduce the relevant entry barriers. Instead, it would 
greatly increase entry barriers by preventing any ﬁ  rm—including Google 
and its rivals—from obtaining similar default rights. This would make it 
impossible for any ﬁ  rm to offer books that are unclaimed or insufﬁ  ciently 
valuable to make it worthwhile for anyone (including the rightsholder) to 
incur the transaction costs of licensing, and would make it much more dif-
ﬁ  cult for any ﬁ  rm to provide easy searchable access to most of the books 
that have been written. It would be perverse to employ antitrust law to re-
quire such an anticompetitive result. 
  Any claimed anticompetitive effects must be measured from the but-for 
baseline of what would happen without the settlement. Because commer-
cially unavailable books are deﬁ  ned to be whatever set of books no seller 
ﬁ  nds worth offering for new sales in the future, and because nothing in the 
settlement increases the difﬁ  culty of offering any set of books, by deﬁ  nition 
any set of commercially unavailable books that Google can offer under the 
settlement will be books that would not be offered by anyone without the 
settlement.  
 The available evidence indicates that without this sort of class action settle-
ment, no ﬁ  rm would offer widespread digital access to the set of  in-copyright 
books that are currently commercially unavailable. Google itself did not at-
tempt to do so before the settlement. Google just digitized these books for 
purposes of searches that gave snippets of text, which it argued was covered 
25      Fraser 2009, 2 (acknowledging it would have been an “impossibility” for Google to have 
reached agreements with all rightsholders absent the class action settlement); Grimmelman 
Initial Brief at 9 (arguing without the settlement “Google itself could never, under any cir-
cumstances, have privately negotiated the permissions” to orphan books and that thus “no 
competitor will ever be able to obtain the necessary permissions to make competing uses of 
them.”); Yahoo Initial Brief at 24.   
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 18 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
by the fair use doctrine, without making any effort to offer their full text. 
26  
If the settlement were rejected and Google lost the litigation, it wouldn’t be 
able to offer even those searches and snippets, and in the best case scenario 
where Google won the litigation, the fair use basis for its victory would limit 
Google to offering no more than those searches and snippets.  
  Nor has any other ﬁ  rm attempted to offer the full text of a similar set 
of books without going through a similar class action settlement process. 
In fact, the most likely potential entrants into the digital book market have 
afﬁ  rmatively demonstrated that they would be unlikely to do so. Amazon 
began its “Search Inside the Book” feature in 2003 by scanning over 120,000 
books for which it provides a partial preview, but it did not provide full digi-
tal text for any books or extend these partial displays to any out-of-print 
works or any books where it did not have prior publisher approval (Quint 
2003). Microsoft attempted to assemble a library of 750,000 public domain 
and licensed commercially available works, but later abandoned the proj-
ect in May 2008, explaining that its Live Book Search did not constitute a 
“sustainable business model” (Helft 2008). This suggests that even a giant 
like Microsoft ﬁ  nds it unproﬁ  table to offer a digital library combining out-
of-copyright and commercially available books that does not include the in-
copyright, commercially unavailable books that would be hard or impossible 
to offer without a settlement like this. Microsoft's experience thus indicates 
that offering users the knowledge that they are searching through a complete 
or nearly-complete database of books may be a necessary precondition for a 
successful business model. Microsoft itself admitted as much when, in its on-
line announcement that it was ending its Book Search project, it noted that 
it hoped to move to “more sustainable strategies” in which “our investments 
will help increase the discoverability of   all   the valuable content that resides 
in the world of books and scholarly publications” (Bing 2008). If so, this con-
ﬁ  rms the high procompetitive beneﬁ  ts of allowing a settlement that creates 
such a universal library. Either way, this indicates that without this settle-
ment, neither Amazon nor Microsoft would provide anything resembling 
the near-universal access to digital books that this settlement provides.  
  But it does not matter whether this factual prediction is right or not. For 
if Amazon, Microsoft, or any Google rival does in the future offer any books 
26      Joint Public FAQ from Authors Guild, Association of American Publishers & Google, Ques-
tion # 6, available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/faq.html; Conversation 
with Eric Schmidt hosted by Danny Sullivan, Search Engine Strategies Conference, August 9, 
2006, available at http://www.google.com/press/podium/ses2006.html.   
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for new sale that are not derived from the Google scanning project, then 
(even if those books are currently out of print) those books will become 
“commercially available,” and then the settlement will by default exclude 
them from sale via Google. The settlement thus by deﬁ  nition does not give 
Google any default license or plausible de facto monopoly over any books 
that any rival would offer in the but-for world. 
  This but-for baseline has several implications. Even if the settlement 
gave Google the power to set monopoly prices for unclaimed books or for 
widespread digital access to commercially unavailable books (which as we 
shall see is contrary to fact), that would not be an anticompetitive effect 
because having a monopolist offer a product is better for consumer welfare 
than having no one offer a product. Nor is it at all unusual or improper 
if the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  rm to overcome the entry barriers to offering a product reaps 
monopoly proﬁ  ts from doing so. That is regarded as their proper reward 
for investing to overcome those entry barriers and provide consumers with 
a desired product. 
27   Investing to be the ﬁ  rst to overcome entry barriers is 
procompetitive, not anticompetitive, as long as the ﬁ  rm does not artiﬁ  -
cially increase entry barriers for later rivals. The ﬁ  rst-mover’s investment in 
overcoming those entry barriers makes consumers better off and restrains 
no competition that would have existed in the but-for world. That is espe-
cially true where, as here, the ﬁ  rst-mover’s investments in overcoming those 
  entry barriers actually lower entry barriers for subsequent rivals. 
  In fact, the settlement is even more beneﬁ  cial to consumers than sug-
gested above because, even if no rival enters to provide these otherwise 
commercially unavailable books, this settlement would not give Google the 
power to set monopoly prices over any set of digital books because the set-
tlement (1) gives individual rightsholders total freedom to price their books 
through Google or any Google rivals, and (2) requires that Google set prices 
for individual books and institutional subscriptions using algorithms that 
27     Verizon Communications v. Law Ofﬁ  ces of Curtis V. Trinko,  540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere 
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only 
not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge 
monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the ﬁ  rst 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth”); Elhauge 2003a, 
332 (“when a ﬁ  rm uses proper conduct to create something sufﬁ  ciently more valuable than 
existing market options to enjoy dominant market power, then any high prices it earns are the 
proper social reward for that creation . . .”); Elhauge 2003b, 796, (“We thus must be careful not 
to act as if the purpose of antitrust laws were to eliminate monopoly proﬁ  ts themselves. Such 
proﬁ  ts are an extremely valuable inducement to the creation of better or cheaper products.”).   
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mimic competitive pricing. The details are explained in Part 3. Here, the 
important point to emphasize is that we should not infer, from the fact that 
the settlement would (even if rivals do not enter) create something as close 
as feasible to competitive market pricing, that the but-for baseline should 
be taken to be a fully competitive market in distributing these books, be-
cause that clearly would not exist without this settlement. Instead, without 
this settlement there would by deﬁ  nition be no market in unclaimed or 
commercially unavailable books, and thus no ﬁ  rm offering them or a near-
universal library. 
  Accordingly, even if this settlement failed to eliminate all possible 
  supracompetitive pricing, it would still be beneﬁ  cial to consumer welfare 
because it would increase but-for future output of these books from noth-
ing to something, although the future output would not be quite as high as 
it would be with full competitive pricing. If, as argued below, the settlement 
does provide full competitive pricing even without rival entry, then the re-
sults are even more beneﬁ  cial to consumers. Alternatively, if rivals in fact do 
later provide these same otherwise commercially unavailable books, then 
encouraging settlements like this will lead to full competitive pricing for 
these books, which again would be even more beneﬁ  cial to consumers. But 
these remarkable procompetitive effects do not alter the fact that the ap-
plicable antitrust test is whether the settlement improves consumer welfare 
from the but-for world, not whether it maximizes consumer welfare to the 
fullest extent conceivable. The DOJ’s own guidelines stress that this   but-for 
baseline applies when assessing the effects of horizontal business agreements, 
stating that “Rule of reason analysis focuses on the state of competition 
with, as compared to without, the relevant agreement” (Federal Trade 
Commission & Department of Justice 2000, §3.3). 
  2.3. Responding to the Critique of the But-For Baseline 
  Professor Randal Picker has critiqued this but-for baseline on two grounds, 
neither of which is well-founded. First, he equates the but-for baseline with 
a historical presettlement baseline, and argues that my reliance on a but-for 
baseline is thus incorrect because a cartel that starts just before a new product 
is introduced may result in more output than the past, but is still harm-
ful (Picker 2009a, 4–6). This argument clearly attacks a straw man because 
antitrust has never understood a but-for baseline to equal a past baseline, 
and certainly I have never equated the two. The but-for baseline is what the 
market situation would be “but for” the alleged misconduct, and the whole 
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reason antitrust uses this “but for” baseline is to  distinguish  it from what the 
market situation was in the past. 
28   Indeed, in my writing I have expressly 
cautioned   against   replacing the but-for baseline with a past baseline based 
on the pre-conduct world, stating that “using a past baseline may falsely 
suggest the conduct caused no damages even though the conduct did anti-
competitively make prices higher than they would have been in the but-for 
world without that conduct” (Elhauge 2008b, 21). 
29    
  There is thus no tenable basis to claim, as Picker does, that by the but-for 
world I mean the “pre-settlement world” (Picker 2009a, 6). I don’t. To the 
contrary, my argument is that the critics themselves claim that entry barriers 
unrelated to the settlement will in the future prevent any ﬁ  rm from provid-
ing commercially unavailable books without a Google-like settlement; thus, 
the critics’ own claim means that the future “but for” world without the 
settlement would be a world where  no  ﬁ rm can offer commercially unavailable 
books. 
30  While Picker is certainly correct that antitrust should not allow agree-
ments simply because they result in higher output or lower prices than the 
past, antitrust should and does allow agreements that result in higher output 
and lower prices than would result in the but-for world without the challenged 
agreement. Disapproving a settlement that satisﬁ  es this but-for test would 
condemn us all to suffering lower output and higher prices than the output 
and prices we would enjoy from 2010 onward with settlement approval. 
  Second, Picker argues that a but-for baseline would approve an agree-
ment that bundles an anticompetitive agreement with an unrelated 
28     See, e.g.,   Maarten Pieter Schinkel 2008, 23 (“An essential part of assessing antitrust damages 
is to determine what would have been the market situation absent the competitive acts— 
sometimes referred to as the ‘but-for’ world.”); Ariel Katz 2007, 882 (“Antitrust looks at the 
effect of a speciﬁ  c restraint or conduct on the ﬁ  rm’s (or the involved ﬁ  rms') ability to set their 
price higher or lower relative to a relevant benchmark, which should generally be the price 
(or other relevant variable) that would have existed but for the impugned conduct.”); Roger 
D. Blair & Christine A. Piette 2006, 413 (“In general, an antitrust plaintiff should recover the 
difference between its actual economic condition and the condition it would have enjoyed but 
for the antitrust violation.”).   
29     See also   Elhauge 2008b, 414, arguing against using a baseline of prices before an alleged anti-
competitive program because if costs or market power would otherwise have decreased over 
time, then the “but-for price that would have been charged in a later period would be lower 
than the price that was charged in the period before the program, and thus the pre-program 
price would be too high a baseline.”   
30      For reasons noted above, I agree that   without   approval of class action settlements like this one, 
no ﬁ  rm would offer the set of books that would be commercially unavailable in the but-for 
world, but it seems to me quite plausible that rivals would offer those books   with   approval of 
this settlement because the settlement lowers rival entry barriers in various ways.   
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procompetitive agreement if the net effects are positive (2009a, 5–7). But, 
once again, this misconstrues the but-for baseline, which judges each sepa-
rable agreement separately. If agreement on one provision has anticompet-
itive effects and does not contribute to the procompetitive effects of the rest 
of the agreement, then it is separable and the but-for test would condemn 
the anticompetitive provision because the procompetitive portions of the 
agreement would go forward in the but-for world without the separable 
anticompetitive provision. The assertion that the but-for test presupposes 
that anything grouped in one contract has to be treated as a unit is thus 
another straw man and not at all a premise used in my analysis.  
  Here, the critics are condemning provisions that, viewed separately, have 
clear procompetitive effects because they increase output and decrease 
prices from but-for levels. Consider the four main critiques the objectors 
have made.  
 Their  ﬁ  rst critique argues that a class action settlement cannot give 
Google a nonexclusive default license to sell commercially unavailable 
books, partly because copyright law makes it illegal to copy without express 
rightsholder authorization. 
31   This argument strikes me as quite dubious: 
the whole point of class actions is to give class counsel abilities to act on 
behalf of class members, and class actions often authorize things on behalf 
of people who otherwise legally have to give express authorization. 
32   After 
all, waivers of legal claims under tort, antitrust, or securities law must also 
generally be express, and no one has ever thought this means that tort, an-
titrust, and securities claims cannot be resolved by opt-out class actions. 
In any event, the default license granted by the settlement is necessary to 
achieve the relevant procompetitive effects because without a default li-
cense, as the critics themselves argue, no ﬁ  rm could offer unclaimed and 
commercially unavailable books. Thus, in the but-for world, holders of 
copyrights in unclaimed and commercially unavailable books would get 
zero royalties and readers would be deprived of access to their books. 
31      Amazon Initial Brief at 31–34; Microsoft Objection to Proposed Settlement,   Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05 CV 8136-DC, at 3, 6 (Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
“Microsoft Initial Brief”]; Open Book Alliance Objection to Proposed Settlement,   Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,   S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05 CV 8136-DC, at 2 (Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
“Open Book Alliance Initial Brief”]; Yahoo Initial Brief at 7–10; Peters 2009, 3, 5–8.   
32      Although the critics repeatedly refer to the default license as a “compulsory license,” this char-
acterization is incorrect. Rightsholders can opt out of the settlement, or even if they do not, 
can opt out of the license at any time in the future, and indeed can opt in, and out, and back, 
and forth of the license and any separable license features at any time.   See infra   Part 3.   
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  Given that nothing in the copyright statute states that it prohibits   waivers 
via class action, it is hard to see why, despite this statutory silence, a copy-
right provision that was designed to protect copyright owners should be 
interpreted to require harming both copyright owners (by lessening their 
royalties) and the public (by lessening their access to books). As Professor 
Grimmelman notes, the twin purposes of copyright law are to reward au-
thors and maximize the creative works actually made available to the  public. 
33  
It seems quite perverse to interpret statutory silence to thwart both of the 
statute’s purposes. It seems equally perverse to argue that sound class action 
procedure under Rule 23 requires an interpretation that, by precluding de-
fault licenses, harms unknown rightsholders in the name of protecting their 
rights, and indeed harms all class members and the class defendant, as well 
as the public interest in accessing these books. 
34   Even if copyright law and 
Rule 23 did require such a perverse result, it is clear that antitrust law does 
not, because the nonexclusive default license over commercially unavailable 
books, standing alone, has strong   procompetitive effects. 
  The second critique is that the settlement does not go far enough because 
it does not also authorize default licenses for Google’s rivals. 
35   This second 
critique is quite inconsistent with the ﬁ  rst one. If a settlement of litigation 
between a class of rightsholders and Google cannot, as critics argue, grant de-
fault licenses to Google under copyright law or Rule 23, then   a fortiori   such a 
settlement cannot grant default licenses to rivals that were not even involved 
33      Grimmelman Initial Brief at 2.   
34      Many critics argued that a class settlement must be limited to past conduct and could not pro-
vide forward-looking licenses.   See   Amazon Initial Brief at 1–2, 34–40; Microsoft Initial Brief at 
4, 21–25; Yahoo Initial Brief at 17–19. However, the DOJ rejected this critics’ position on the 
ground that a “class of copyright holders may be able to settle a lawsuit over past conduct by 
licensing a broader range of conduct to obtain global ‘copyright peace.’”     Initial DOJ Brief at 6. 
The DOJ’s Rule 23 concerns were instead whether possible class conﬂ  ict issues might be raised 
because the class settlement (1) covered rightholders from certain objecting foreign nations, 
(2) had the Registry act for both known and unknown rightsholders, (3) allowed expansion to 
unspeciﬁ  ed future revenue models, and (4) provided that royalties earned on unclaimed books 
could inure to the beneﬁ  t of the Registry and known rightsholders if the unknown rightshold-
ers were never found.   See    id.   at 6–13. Whatever the merits of those initial concerns, they seem 
to be addressed by the amended settlement, which (1) excludes books that were registered in 
the United States or published in the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia, (2) creates an 
independent ﬁ  duciary to represent unknown rightsholders, (3) speciﬁ  es the future revenue 
models, and (4) prevents royalties for unclaimed books from ever inuring to the beneﬁ  t of 
the Registry or known rightsholders.   See   Amended Settlement §§ 1.19, 3.2(e)(i), 3.10(e)(iii), 
4.2(c)(i), 4.5(b)(ii)., 4.7, 6.2(b)(i), 6.3(a)(3).   
35      Initial DOJ Brief at 25 & n.10; Grimmelman 2009a; Open Book Alliance Initial Brief at 29–31; 
Picker 2009b, 3, 10–12.   
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in the litigation. If the critics really believe that granting default licenses is 
illegal under copyright law or Rule 23, then they should oppose granting de-
fault licenses to anyone, and be prepared to defend an interpretation of those 
laws that manages to harm not only copyright owners and users, but also 
all class members, the class defendant, and the public interest. If they really 
don’t believe that granting default licenses is illegal under those laws, then 
they shouldn’t raise an invalid objection to try to squeeze a better deal out of 
Google and the rightsholders. Anyone who argues that the settlement should 
authorize default licenses to rivals has implicitly conceded that authorizing 
default licenses to Google does not violate copyright law or Rule 23. 
 Moreover, this second critique never comes to grips with the fact that the 
settlement  already  authorizes the Registry and Fiduciary to license Google’s 
rivals “to the extent permitted by law.” So the only way the settlement doesn’t 
authorize licensing rivals would be if it turns out to be illegal to do so. Do 
the critics want the settlement to authorize licensing rivals even if that is 
illegal? That would be bizarre and, in any event, ineffective. Or, more likely, 
do the critics want no one to get default licenses unless the settlement can 
legally authorize default licenses for both Google and its rivals? That seems 
a more plausible reading of their position, but would clearly violate the 
but-for test because a world where Google alone can offer unclaimed and 
commercially unavailable books is clearly better for consumer welfare than 
a world where no one can, especially given that the settlement provides for 
competitive pricing through Google. 
  Even if we ignore the fact that the settlement does authorize licensing 
rivals if it is legal to do so, this second critique does not support Professor 
Picker’s bundling claim. The second critique does not show that nonex-
clusive default licenses to Google have anticompetitive effects that the parties 
are attempting to bundle with other provisions that have procompetitive 
effects. The nonexclusive default licenses to Google over commercially 
  unavailable books, standing alone, have pure procompetitive effects over 
the but-for baseline, without bundling them with any other provisions. The 
second critique instead claims that the court should disapprove nonexclu-
sive default licenses that   do   enhance consumer welfare (compared to the 
but-for baseline) unless the parties   add   more nonexclusive default licenses 
that would enhance consumer welfare even further. 
  It is   this   move that is improper under antitrust’s but-for standard because 
it is not an antitrust violation to enter into an agreement that beneﬁ  ts con-
sumer welfare on the theory that another agreement could have beneﬁ  tted 
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consumer welfare even more. 
36  The reason is plain to see: if the critics’ implicit 
antitrust standard were the law, then every single joint venture that charged 
anything for its product would be an antitrust violation because it would ben-
eﬁ  t consumer welfare even more if the joint venture offered its product for 
free. And if that were the law, no one would propose joint ventures that ben-
eﬁ  t   consumer welfare at all. This free-product baseline is not only the logical 
implication of the critics’ implicit baseline, but is sometimes invoked more 
explicitly. At a conference I attended about this settlement, some opponents 
who complained that the settlement treated rightsholders unfairly made clear 
that their objections would go away if the settlement provided unclaimed 
books for free. This position begs the question of why rightsholders would be 
better off if required to take the zero royalties they would get on free books 
rather than the positive royalties they would get under the settlement.  More 
important for present purposes, this position indicates that some critics are 
relying on a free access baseline that, while a common norm among many 
Internet enthusiasts, is not the but-for baseline required by antitrust law. 
  Nor do I know of any case that has held that authorities can disapprove 
a settlement between two parties whose provisions each beneﬁ  t the pub-
lic interest on the ground that the settlement could have added additional 
beneﬁ  ts to the public interest. The power to protect against settlements that 
harm the public interest is not a license to threaten settlement disapproval 
in order to expropriate as much from the settling parties as possible, even if 
the expropriation is done in the name of beneﬁ  tting the public. Distorting 
the settlement approval process in that fashion is not in the long run best 
interests of the public interest, for at least two reasons. First, the authorities 
might get the game theory wrong, blowing up settlements and preventing 
any beneﬁ  t to the public interest. Second, expropriating as much as possible 
of the joint gains will discourage ex ante investments to create those joint 
gains in the ﬁ  rst place. 
  The third major critique has been that the provisions specifying de-
fault prices and royalties for commercially unavailable books amount to 
36      Nor could one say that this second critique is relying on the less restrictive alternative test 
because that test only applies when an agreement restrains competition to further a procom-
petitive justiﬁ  cation that could equally be advanced through some alternative that is less re-
straining of competition. Here, the nonexclusive default licenses to Google do not restrain 
competition   at all;   the critique is instead that   independent   factors restrain rival entry and that 
the settlement does not fully overcome those factors for rivals. Thus, the second critique is 
not applying a less restrictive alternative test: it is applying a “more beneﬁ  cial alternative” test, 
which fails for the reasons noted in text.   
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illegal horizontal price-ﬁ  xing, 
37   even though the default prices are set with 
a   competition-mimicking algorithm and any rightsholder can competitive-
ly set its own price and would have incentives to do so if supracompetitive 
prices were set. This argument is wrong for many reasons detailed in Part 3, 
but for present purposes the important point is that these provisions are   not  
separable from the default licenses because one cannot have a default license 
without some default price and royalty. Thus, the only way to avoid default 
prices and royalties would be not to have default licenses at all, making it im-
possible to offer unclaimed books and infeasible to offer books that by deﬁ  ni-
tion would otherwise be commercially unavailable. Condemnation of these 
provisions would thus clearly harm consumer welfare relative to the correct 
but-for   standard. This application of the but-for test does not at all depend 
on an argument, as Professor Picker asserts, that these provisions have anti-
competitive effects that are outweighed by other procompetitive effects of the 
settlement. 
   In its initial brief, the DOJ challenged the need for default pricing and 
royalties, stating: “The parties’ contention that this kind of industry-wide 
pricing mechanism is necessary to create a vibrant market for digital books 
is difﬁ  cult to reconcile with the facts on the ground. Millions of digital 
books are already available for purchase, including growing numbers of 
out-of-print books, as a result of bilateral negotiations between distribu-
tors and individual rightsholders.” 
38   But this DOJ statement misses the 
point that the settlement does not grant default licenses for any book that is 
commercially available for new sale from any source other than the Google 
scan, whether or not the book is out of print in the physical sense. 
39   So the 
settlement by deﬁ  nition provides no default license or prices or royalties 
for the millions of digital books that are—or will be—available for pur-
chase from sources other than the Google scan covered by the settlement. 
The DOJ’s initial brief also asserted that the provisions on default prices 
and royalties were not “reasonably necessary to achieve the stated beneﬁ  t 
of the Proposed Settlement—breathing new commercial life into millions 
37      Initial DOJ Brief at 17–21; Amazon Initial Brief at 1, 18–24, 30; Open Book Alliance Initial 
Brief at 2, 27–28; Yahoo Initial Brief at 22–23; Fraser 2009, 15–17; Picker 2009c, 383, 385, 398, 
408; Picker 2009b, 5–6.   
38      Initial DOJ Brief at 22.   
39      Amended Settlement §1.31 (deﬁ  ning “commercially available”);   infra   note __ (collecting pro-
visions that create default license for books that are not commercially available).   
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of long-forgotten, commercially unavailable works.” 
40   But it provided no 
support for this assertion, which seems directly contrary to the DOJ’s point 
on the very next page that without similar default licenses rivals would be 
unable to offer unclaimed books. 
41   The latter is more persuasive because 
without default terms on prices and royalties, a ﬁ  rm would have to obtain 
the consent of the rightsholder on the price and royalty, and as the DOJ 
notes “consent cannot be obtained from the owners of orphan works.” 
42  
Nor, without default licenses, would anyone ﬁ  nd it worthwhile to negoti-
ate licenses for other commercially unavailable books given that, by deﬁ  ni-
tion, those books would be commercially unavailable without such default 
licenses.  
  The fourth critique has been that the settlement covers both claimed 
and unclaimed books, and should jettison the latter category (Picker 2009c, 
383, 409). This objection to settlement bundling fails because, as shown in 
the next Part, the settlement is enormously procompetitive for each and 
 every category of books, viewed entirely separately. Further, unbundling the 
book categories would afﬁ  rmatively reduce the procompetitive effects of 
the settlement without alleviating the supposed anticompetitive concerns. 
After all, a great deal of the value of this settlement comes from creating 
a common searchable database for locating and viewing a near-universal 
library of books. The whole is more valuable than the sum of its parts, and 
it is that collective value that makes it commercially feasible to offer books 
that otherwise would be commercially unavailable. Moreover, if unclaimed 
books were separated, unknown rightsholders would not have the same 
incentives to register to get the advantages of being a known rightsholder 
and there would not be a commonly funded Registry to help locate them. 
To the extent that unknown rightsholders are a problem, separating them 
would prevent the settlement from reducing the size of that problem. Nor 
would separating them help alleviate anticompetitive concerns because a 
separate settlement that licensed unclaimed books would still have to set 
some price for those books, and it is hard to know how one could do much 
better than requiring a pricing mechanism designed to mimic how their 
unknown rightsholders would have competitively set prices if they had all 
the information Google will have. 
40      Initial DOJ Brief at 22.   
41     Id.   at 23.   
42     Id.   at 23.   
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  2.4. The Alternative of Waiting for Congress 
  Some suggest that the settlement should be disapproved because instead 
Congress should or likely would enact orphan works legislation. 
43   But I 
have never heard of a case where an agreement with procompetitive effects 
was rejected on the ground that the but-for world should or would feature 
new legislation that will achieve those procompetitive beneﬁ  ts. And with 
good reason. 
  First, it is presumptuous for any court to assume what Congress will do. 
Waiting for legislative action can be like waiting for Godot. It may never 
come. People have been waiting for years for orphan works legislation, and 
it has not happened yet. If legislation does come, it may be in an unex-
pected or limited form. No one can be sure that any new legislation would 
give readers the access to commercially unavailable books that the settle-
ment will offer. Even if the new legislation solved the problem of unclaimed 
books, it might not provide the default licenses necessary to restore com-
mercial viability to claimed books that would otherwise be commercially 
unavailable. 
  Second, nothing in the settlement in any way precludes effective con-
gressional action. If, in the but-for world, Congress would enact legisla-
tion giving many ﬁ  rms an ability to distribute books that are unclaimed 
or otherwise commercially unavailable, then Congress can and would still 
do so with the settlement. Because every right given by the settlement is 
nonexclusive, it in no way impedes any congressional effort to authorize 
the distribution of unclaimed or commercially unavailable books. In short, 
if effective new legislation does come, the settlement causes no harm. But 
if effective new legislation doesn’t come, then blocking the settlement will 
consign to oblivion all unclaimed and commercially unavailable books. 
  Third, an approved settlement would, if anything, make congressional ac-
tion more likely for other reasons. To begin with, it would make legislative 
action administratively easier because it creates an administrative apparatus, 
the Registry and Fiduciary, that Congress can use to grant licensing rights 
and distribute royalties on unclaimed books. Moreover, the settlement would 
lessen the objection, which might otherwise be raised to orphan books legisla-
tion, that unclaimed books cannot be sold without express rightsholder con-
sent, because those books would already be sold. Finally, the settlement would 
43      Amazon Initial Brief at 7–15; Microsoft Initial Brief at 3–4, 6–16; Open Book Alliance 2009;   
    Yahoo Initial Brief at 2–7; Grimmelman Initial Brief at 18–19; Darnton 2009b; Peters 2009, 7–8.   
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create powerful interest groups, supported by Google’s rivals, favoring orphan 
works legislation, and Google has already pledged to support it as well.  
  In short, it would be risky to block the settlement based on specula-
tion that Congress might perhaps do better, unnecessary to do so given 
that Congress could equally take any desirable action with the settlement, 
and counterproductive to do so given that blocking the settlement makes 
Congressional action less likely. It is thus not surprising that the but-for 
test has never been interpreted to mean that an agreement to overcome en-
try barriers should be prohibited because new legislation might overcome 
those same entry barriers a bit more broadly. 
  3. THE STRONG PROCOMPETITIVE EFFECTS AND LACK OF 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
  Relative to the proper but-for baseline, the settlement has remarkably 
strong procompetitive effects and no anticompetitive effects. The analysis 
is easiest to follow if one takes each category of books in turn. 
  3.1. Out-of-Copyright Books 
  Although the settlement nominally does not apply to out-of-copyright 
books, it does affect them for reasons noted above. In particular, the settle-
ment creates and funds a process that will increase the number of books 
that are effectively in the public domain by clarifying that they are out of 
copyright. The fact that the settlement clariﬁ  es their status also encourages 
Google to digitize them for reader access, as does the fact that the rest of 
the settlement gives Google the opportunity to create a universal search-
able library. Google allows searchers to read, download, and print out-
of-copyright books for free. 
44   Creating an expanded, digitized set of free 
out-of-copyright books has several procompetitive effects.  
  Lower  Reader  Costs.   The Google Book Search program dramatically low-
ers the costs of ﬁ  nding and owning out-of-copyright books. Without the 
Google Book Search program, it might be difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, to dis-
cover whether an out-of-copyright book might be of interest. Once discov-
ered, copies of the book might be impossible or costly to ﬁ  nd and buy in the 
used-book market if they are rare. Even if they are available in a library, it 
44   Joint Public FAQ from Authors Guild, Association of American Publishers & Google, Question # 9, 
available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/faq.html.   
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might costly to travel to a library that has them, the library might not   allow 
duplication of rare books, and any allowed photocopies may be of poor 
quality. Further, rummaging through used-book stores or libraries imposes 
considerable delay. With the Google Book Search program, anyone online 
can easily search the full text of all out-of-copyright books to ﬁ  nd which 
books are of interest, and immediately read, download, or print them for 
free. Because the settlement expands the set of books that are available as 
digitized out-of-copyright books, it lowers the costs and delays of buying 
and reading these books to zero, and thus increases output, whether mea-
sured in number of book copies or reading experiences. 
  Lower Rival Costs.   The settlement lowers the costs for any Google rivals 
who wish to also offer out-of-copyright books, as explained above, by al-
lowing rivals to buy digitized copies of these books from fully participating 
libraries and by clarifying which books are in fact out of copyright. Because 
Google offers these books for free, this increased distribution competition 
cannot further reduce book prices, but it can make the books available in 
even more platforms and help constrain any Google advertising prices. 
    Lower Used Book Prices for Out-of-Copyright Books.   Expanding the set of 
out-of-copyright books that are available for free should exert downward 
pressure on used book prices for these books. This will beneﬁ  t even con-
sumers who do not want digital books and only like to read books with 
printed pages.  
    Lower Prices for Competing In-Copyright Books.   The expanded free avail-
ability of all out-of-copyright books can also put downward pressure on 
licensing fees and book prices for some in-copyright books. For example, 
readers who want great or fun literature may ﬁ  nd many out-of-copyright 
books that, at a price of zero, they are willing to read instead of buying an 
in-copyright book. Thus, expanding the free and easy availability of out-
of-copyright books can also be expected to have procompetitive effects on 
prices for the remaining categories of books. 
  No Anticompetitive Effect.  The settlement has no anticompetitive effect on 
out-of-copyright books, and as far as I know no critic has even suggested 
any might exist. The effect on out-of-copyright books is thus solely and 
unremittingly procompetitive. 
  3.2. Commercially Available Books 
  Resolving Unclear Digital Rights.   Currently, it is often unclear—even for 
some commercially available books—whether the author or publisher 
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holds   digital rights because their contractual language frequently did not 
 anticipate  digitization. 
45   This can lead to an unfortunate state of affairs 
where neither the author nor publisher is willing to give a digital license 
because the proﬁ  ts from doing so are smaller than the risk of paying statu-
tory damages if the other is ultimately held to have the right. However, each 
would be willing to sue if the book were published without their permis-
sion, given the prospect of collecting those statutory damages. The settle-
ment lowers these transaction and risk-bearing costs by providing a clear 
process by which, despite such uncertainty, decisions can be made about 
whether to allow a book to be included in the digital database and displayed 
or sold through Google. 
46   This makes it much easier to license these books 
for   digital sale, and thus increases the output of these books. This is a clear 
procompetitive beneﬁ  t with no anticompetitive effect. 
  Allowing Book Searches.   The settlement further allows Google to digitize 
all books published before January 5, 2009, thus making them searchable 
by readers, and to provide indexing information about the books found 
in searches, unless the rightsholder chooses to remove the book from the 
Google database. 
47   Google then uses this information to direct searchers to 
bookstores or local libraries where the books are available. 
48  This is a clearly 
procompetitive result with no anticompetitive effect. It increases the ability 
of buyers to ﬁ  nd which books they want and where to buy them, without 
in any way impeding competition among book sellers. If rightsholders pre-
fer not to promote their books in this way, they can always remove them 
from the searchable database. Without the settlement, Google might have 
lost the litigation and been unable to digitize these books and make them 
searchable unless it afﬁ  rmatively secured permission from each rightsholder, 
which would have imposed prohibitive costs. 
45     Random House v. Rosetta Books, LLC,   150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),   aff’d per curiam ,  283 
F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (ﬁ  nding that contractual language that gives the right to “print” a book 
does not give a right to make digital copies).   
46      Amended Settlement Attachment A, Articles V–VI.   
47      Amended Settlement §3.1(a) (allowing digitization of all books); §3.2(b) (making all in- print 
books “no display” by default); §3.4(a) (allowing Google to make “non-display” uses of “no 
display books”); §1.94 (deﬁ  ning “non-display uses” to allow searches of the full text and pro-
viding indexing information but not displaying any content of the books); §3.5(a)(i) (allowing 
rightsholder to remove book from digitized database).   
48      Google 2009: “if the book you want is available in a bookstore or nearby library, we'll continue 
to point you to those resources, as we've always done.”
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    Allowing Display and Nonexclusive Sale Through Google.   By default, actual 
content from commercially available books can neither be displayed nor 
sold by Google. 
49   However, the settlement provides that rightsholders may 
at any time choose to allow Google to display free preview portions of their 
commercially available books. 
50   If the rightsholder chooses to allow dis-
play, then its book is by default available for nonexclusive sale on Google 
both through individual consumer purchase and institutional subscrip-
tions, but a rightsholder may at any time choose to make a displayed com-
mercially available book unavailable for sale by Google through either or 
both means. 
51   Likewise, Google can exclude a book from any display uses 
or sales for any “non-editorial” reason. 
52   By default, books sold through 
Google are fully viewable online, but can be cut and pasted only 4 pages at 
a time and printed only 20 pages a time, although rightsholders can remove 
those limits to permit as much copying and printing of their books as they 
49      Amended Settlement §3.2(b) (making all commercially available books “no display” by de-
fault); §3.4(a) (allowing Google to make “non-display” uses of “no display books”); §1.94 
(“‘Non-Display Uses” means uses that do not display expression from Digital Copies of Books 
or Inserts to the public”).   
50      Amended Settlement §3.4(b) (“Rightsholders of Books may . . . direct Google or the Registry 
to change the classiﬁ  cation of a No Display Book to a Display Book, or to include any or all of 
their No Display Books in one or more the Display Uses”); §1.52 (“‘Display Uses’ means the 
following: Snippet Display, Front Matter Display, Access Uses and Preview Uses”). Although 
§3.2(e)(i) provides that the Registry can also change a book to display status, Amended Settle-
ment Attachment A §5.1 provides that “for an In-Print Book, both the Author and the Pub-
lisher of such Book must agree, in accordance with the following procedure, that Google may 
make one or more Display Uses of the Book.” Thus, it appears that §3.2(e)(i) allows the Reg-
istry to change commercially available books to display status only with prior approval of the 
rightsholders, thus allowing a convenient way for the rightsholders to communicate to Google 
through the Registry without giving the Registry a right to act without their permission.   
51      Amended Settlement §1.52 (“display uses” includes “access uses”); §1.1 (“access uses” means 
“Institutional Subscriptions, Consumer Purchase and the Public Access Service”); §3.5(b)(i) 
(allowing a rightsholder to remove its book from any “display use” or any “revenue model”); 
§1.131 (deﬁ  ning “revenue model” to include “Institutional Subscriptions, Consumer Pur-
chases, Advertising Uses, Public Access Service and any other revenue models”); §3.5(b)(iii) 
(providing that commercially available books are exempt from the “coupling requirement” 
that requires rightsholders of commercially unavailable books to make any book they make 
available for consumer purchase also available for institutional subscription); §2.4 (provid-
ing that any authorizations a rightsholder gives Google are “non-exclusive only” and do not 
preclude “Rightsholder’s right to authorize . . . direct competitors of Google, to use his, her 
or its Books or Inserts in any way, including ways identical to those provided for under this 
 Settlement  Agreement.”)  
52    Amended  Settlement  §3.7(e).  
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want, including giving a Creative Commons License. 
53   For any sales under 
the settlement, Google by default pays rightsholders 63 percent of revenues 
from sales and advertising associated with their books, 
54   but either Google 
or any rightsholder can decline to have a book sold through Google unless 
the other side agrees to change that default royalty rate. 
55  
  Institutional subscriptions cover both commercially available and un-
available books, and raise special issues that will be discussed in a   separate 
section below. Consumer purchases are book by book, and each right-
sholder can (1) set whatever price it wants (including $0) for sale of its 
book through Google, (2) allow Google to set a price for its book using 
a settlement algorithm that is designed to mimic the competitive prices 
that rightsholders would set if they had Google’s information, or (3) use a 
mixed strategy of allowing Google to set its book price using the settlement 
algorithm subject to maximums or minimums speciﬁ  ed by the rightsh-
older. 
56   Rightsholders can also switch back and forth between these three 
pricing methods for consumer purchases through Google. 
57   Further, given 
the above provisions, rightsholders can also (1) sell through a Google rival 
instead of through Google, (2) bargain with Google to sell through Google 
at a royalty rate different from the default offered under the settlement; 
53      Amended Settlement §1.35 (“consumer purchase” includes full viewing online); §1.77 (same 
for “institutional subscription”); §4.1(d) (setting default limits on printing and copying books 
available in institutional subscriptions); §4.2(a) (same for sales through individual book pur-
chase); §3.3(g) (allowing rightsholder to lift any of those limits).   
54    Amended Settlement §2.1(a) (standard revenue split is 70 percent of revenue minus 10 percent 
for operating costs, which comes to 63 percent); §4.5(a) (providing that this 63 percent split by 
default applies to both purchase and advertising revenue); §4.7 (providing that this 63 percent 
split default applies to the possible future revenue models of print on demand, ﬁ  le download, 
or consumer subscriptions). Google also pays $60 per book to rightsholders whose books were 
scanned before May 5, 2009. Settlement §2.1(b).   
55      Amended Settlement §4.5(a)(iii). Although §4.5(a)(iii) is a new provision in the Amended 
Settlement that makes this power explicit for commercially available books, this power al-
ready seemed implicit for all books in that makes this power explicit for commercially avail-
able books, this power already seemed implicit for all books in the original settlement, which 
allowed rightsholders to exclude books, §3.5(b), and allowed Google to decline to distribute 
books for “non-editorial reasons,” §3.7(e), both of which were powers that could be used to 
renegotiate the royalty rate. But the amendment removed any doubt about the issue for com-
mercially available books.   
56    Amended Settlement §4.2(b), (c)(i). To prevent any fear of possible oligopolistic coordination, 
the Registry cannot share algorithm prices with anyone other than the rightsholder of the 
individual book or reveal whether a public price is an algorithm price.   Id.   §4.2(c)(iii).  
57      Amended Settlement §4.5(b)(ii), (c)(i).   
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(3) simultaneously sell the same book through Google and a Google rival 
at any price they wish, and (4) even take advantage of the ability to display 
previews of their books on Google, but have Google direct potential buyers 
to a Google rival rather than allowing sale by Google. For its part, Google 
not only can drop any book for any noneditorial reason, including a desire 
for a lower royalty rate than the settlement default, but also can unilaterally 
discount the list price set by the rightsholder by up to Google’s 37 percent 
revenue share at any time. 
58  
  These settlement provisions have strong procompetitive effects. They 
add a new nonexclusive promotional platform by which buyers can more 
easily identify the books they want and purchase them either through 
Google or its rivals in digital or nondigital form. These provisions do not 
take away or impede any existing vehicles for promoting or selling com-
mercially available books, but add a new one with lower distribution costs 
58      Amended Settlement §§4.5(b)(i). In response to a DOJ objection, this last provision amended 
an original provision that allowed Google to make only “temporary” discounts.  See  Initial DOJ 
Brief at 21–22. This change is interesting because the DOJ intervention here required dropping 
a provision that effectively involved vertical minimum price-ﬁ  xing because the original provi-
sion allowed each individual rightsholder to set both the wholesale and (long term) resale price 
for its book. This may be the ﬁ  rst instance of U.S. agency enforcement against vertical price-
ﬁ  xing in a long time, suggesting some backlash to the Supreme Court decision in   Leegin . What 
is unclear is whether this DOJ intervention was desirable. Vertical price-ﬁ  xing might have 
 procompetitive  justiﬁ  cations like reducing free-riding on services.   Leegin,   551 U.S. at 890–891. 
Here, one might well imagine that rightsholders would want to provide a distribution margin 
large enough to encourage physical booksellers to hire knowledgeable clerks or display their 
books in attractive spaces and to encourage Internet booksellers to provide good promotion 
services or interesting advice on books. Trying to encourage such services could be under-
mined if book buyers could get the beneﬁ  t of those services and then hop right over to Google 
to buy the book at a lower price that does not cover the costs of those services. Moreover, the 
two main anticompetitive concerns about vertical price-ﬁ  xing are that it might reﬂ  ect a cartel 
among downstream retailers or facilitate oligopolistic coordination among upstream provid-
ers.    See Leegin  , 551 U.S. at 892–93. Neither seemed likely here because Google was the only 
retailer covered and because book markets are rarely oligopolistic and temporary discount-
ing can undermine oligopolistic coordination anyway. The initial DOJ brief did not consider 
any procompetitive justiﬁ  cation or the likelihood of actual anticompetitive effects, but simply 
treated this provision as per se illegal, apparently on the assumption that it amounted to a 
horizontal agreement among rightsholders not to discount their book prices.   See  Initial  DOJ 
Brief at 21–22. This characterization seems incorrect because the individual rightsholders al-
ways remained free to discount their book prices by however much they wanted; it was Google 
that was (in the original settlement) restricted in its ability to permanently discount from the 
resale price set by each individual rightsholder. However, it was not clear that the parties ever 
presented a persuasive procompetitive justiﬁ  cation for this provision, in which case summary 
condemnation might be merited even under   Leegin  , which held only that vertical price-ﬁ  xing 
could not be condemned without at least considering procompetitive justiﬁ  cations. In any 
event, the amendment eliminated the issue.   
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and without any shipping delay. These provisions should thus increase the 
output of commercially available books. Even for books that rightshold-
ers choose to make available only in nondigital form, these provisions will 
increase the degree to which purchase decisions reﬂ  ect true consumer pref-
erences because they allow Google searches that expose users to books ir-
respective of print volume or advertising expenditure and that lower the 
transaction costs in searching for obscure commercially available works. 
Economists have shown that websites like Amazon.com that made it easier 
to search online for a greater variety of books led to an annual increase in 
consumer welfare of $731 million–$1.03 billion, which they note is 7–10 
times greater than the consumer welfare gain from the increased competi-
tion and lower costs resulting from the Internet (Brynjolfsson, Hu, & Smith 
2003). Because Google Book Search will make it even easier to search for 
a greater variety of books than are available on Amazon, we can anticipate 
that it will advance this trend. For titles that rightsholders permit Google to 
sell, the procompetitive impact on distribution competition will be direct 
and even greater: Google will become a new competitor to existing retail-
ers, precipitating a reduction in prices, particularly given the low overhead 
costs associated with digital sales. 
  These provisions have no anticompetitive effects given that they leave 
individual rightsholders entirely unrestrained from selling at any price and 
through any distributor or multiple distributors. Some, including the initial 
DOJ brief, have objected that (a) the settlement terms allowing Google to set 
default prices using a settlement algorithm amount to horizontal price-ﬁ  xing 
on retail prices and (b) the settlement’s default royalty rate amounts to hori-
zontal price-ﬁ  xing on wholesale prices. 
59   But these critiques are mistaken on 
several grounds, and it is not clear that the DOJ will stick to its initial view 
now that amendments to the settlement remove any doubt that (1) the algo-
rithm price is competition mimicking, (2) Google and rightsholders can re-
negotiate the default royalty split, and (3) Google can discount the book price 
by its revenue share at any time. However, other critics have suggested that 
these changes do not or might not eliminate their concerns (Picker 2009b, 
5–6). Thus, it is worth explaining in detail why these critiques are mistaken. 
  First  , there is no horizontal agreement among the rightsholders because 
none of them have agreed with each other that they will accept Google’s 
59      Initial DOJ Brief at 17–22; Amazon Initial Brief at 1, 18–24, 30; Yahoo Initial Brief at 22–23; 
Fraser 2009, 15–17; Picker 2009c, 383, 385, 398, 408.   
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algorithm price and royalty split. All the settlement provides is a nonexclu-
sive   offer   by Google to display and sell their books at certain prices with a 
63 percent royalty split, which by default has been  rejected  by all rightshold-
ers of commercially available books. Thus, the settlement could in no way 
be deemed even a tentative horizontal agreement on prices or royalties for 
commercially available books. Rather the settlement requires each right-
sholder to individually decide whether it wants to (1) accept the offer, in 
which case it is still free to sell at any other price or royalty through a Google 
rival; (2) reject the offer and instead sell through a Google rival at any price 
or royalty it wishes, (3) accept the Google offer to sell its book but unilater-
ally set the retail price for that book itself; and (4) reject Google’s standard 
form offer on royalty rates and try to bargain for a different royalty rate from 
Google; (5) accept the Google offer to display its book but not to sell its book; 
and/or (6) accept the Google offer to sell its commercially available book 
through consumer purchase but not through institutional subscription, or 
vice versa. To the extent multiple rightsholders eventually accept Google’s 
offer, this does not create a horizontal agreement among them to do so, but 
rather a series of vertical agreements between each rightsholder and Google 
whereby the individual rightsholder agreed to Google’s standard form offer. 
Nor is the default royalty rate a horizontal agreement among rightsholders 
on royalties that is binding on Google because Google can drop any book 
whose rightsholder does not agree to a different royalty rate. 
  For whatever set of rightsholders eventually choose to distribute their 
books through Google, the situation is just like any case where a distributor 
offers many suppliers an opportunity to sell through the distributor at a given 
price and commission, and many suppliers agree. In such cases, we have a 
series of vertical agreements on the price and commission, but no horizontal 
agreement. Further, because the opportunity is nonexclusive, we have the sort 
of vertical agreements that solely affect distribution through that particular 
distributor and have no exclusionary effect on rivals of that distributor. 
  The Initial DOJ Brief rejected this vertical categorization on the ground 
that “Class representatives—who compete with each other—collectively 
negotiated these pricing terms on behalf of all rightsholders. That some in-
dividual authors or publishers might opt out of those terms does not make 
them any less the product of collective action by competitors.”  60   But this 
argument has zero application to commercially available books, because 
60      Initial DOJ Brief at 18.   
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the settlement negotiated by the class representatives   rejects   those pricing 
terms on behalf of rightsholders of those books, unless the rightsholders 
individually decide otherwise. It is hard to see how an agreement not to 
horizontally agree on something can amount to a horizontal agreement. 
  Second  , for those rightsholders who do choose to accept the Google-set 
price, the settlement requires Google to set prices using an algorithm that 
is designed to mimic competitive rather than cartel pricing. The settlement 
provides: 
 The Pricing Algorithm shall base the Settlement Controlled Price of a Book, 
on an individual Book by Book basis, upon aggregate data collected with 
respect to Books that are similar to such Book and will be designed to op-
erate in a manner that simulates how an individual Book would be priced 
by a Rightsholder of that Book acting in a manner to optimize revenues in 
respect of such Book in a competitive market, that is, assuming no change 
in the price of any other Book. 
61  
  This provision does not authorize Google to use an algorithm that sets a 
schedule of cartel prices for   all   books at the same time that would maxi-
mize revenue for   all   rightsholders collectively. Instead, it explicitly requires 
Google to mimic the competitive pricing that rightsholders would use by 
setting the proﬁ  t-maximizing price for   each  book   separately  , without tak-
ing into account any effect on prices for other books. This provision thus 
does not allow Google to raise prices for multiple books simultaneously to 
levels that, while they would increase group revenue, would not maximize 
an individual rightsholder’s revenue as much as setting the price for its in-
dividual book a little lower to undercut the cartel price. Although I think 
this was also the best interpretation of the original provision, that interpre-
tation required a close reading of the text and possible resort to the canon 
favoring competitive interpretations (Elhauge 2009c, 25–27). So it was use-
ful that the amended settlement added language to remove any ambiguity. 
  To see how this provision works, imagine the following case. Suppose 
there are two books that are partial substitutes but have enough distinctive 
demand so that with competitive pricing they would each sell at $5 rather 
than at the marginal cost of $0, and that if they entered into a cartel the  joint 
 proﬁ  t-maximizing price would be $10 for each book. This provision would 
61    Amended Settlement § 4.2(c)(ii)(2).  See also id.  § 4.2(b)(i)(2) (algorithm must be designed “to 
ﬁ  nd the optimal price for each such Book order to maximize revenues for the Rightsholder for 
such Book and without regard to changes to the price of any other Book”).   
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be violated if Google set a price of $10 for each book, because in setting the 
price for each book separately, each rightsholder would earn more revenue 
if it undercut that $10 price slightly to take sales away from the other book. 
The same would be true for any price Google might set between $5 and 
$10. Thus no price above $5 would maximize revenue for each rightsholder 
when separately setting the price for its book without regard to any effect 
on the price of the other book. 
  Indeed, the settlement algorithm not only precludes cartel pricing, it 
even precludes any form of oligopolistic pricing in any book submarkets, 
because such oligopolistic coordination does require considering the effects 
that a price change might have on rival prices. The settlement algorithm 
thus, if anything, results in   more   competitive pricing than if individual 
rightsholders priced the books themselves, because nothing would prevent 
an individual rightsholder from considering the effects on rival prices and 
implicitly coordinating if that were possible. 
62    
  Third,  if Google tried to misuse its pricing ability to set book prices at su-
pracompetitive levels, each rightsholder would undercut the price in order 
to increase sales of its book. Suppose that in the above hypothetical Google 
did try to set prices at $10 per book. Then each rightsholder would have 
incentives to specify a slightly lower price because that would increase its 
proﬁ  ts, and the settlement explicitly allows it to do so. The other rightsh-
olders in turn would have incentives to undercut that price, until the prices 
spiraled down to the competitive level of $5. They could do so without giv-
ing up Google display or distribution by simply directing Google to charge 
a lower price. They could also do so by charging a lower price through a 
Google rival, and wouldn’t even have to give up having their book sold or 
displayed on Google unless they wanted to do so.  
  The prospect of losing rightsholders to rivals would be particularly cost-
ly to Google because Google would lose the 37% proﬁ  t on books sales, as 
well as lose market share to Google rivals. Thus Google would have power-
ful incentives not to even attempt any price less attractive than the prices 
charged for commercially available books at other retailers, which includes 
not only printed books but digital books at rivals such as Amazon Kindle, 
Sony Reader and Project Gutenberg. Those rival retailers would generally 
determine prices in a but-for world where Google (which without this set-
tlement currently has a 0% market share in books) was not a serious   seller 
62  Bell Atlantic v. Twombly  , 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007); Elhauge 2008b, 547.   
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of digital books. 
63   Google’s prices for commercially available books thus 
could generally be no higher than the but-for prices that would be available 
without the settlement. Indeed, because competition between Google and 
those rivals should lower rival prices, rival pricing should constrain Google 
to charge less than but-for prices. Google’s lack of incentives to attempt 
to set supracompetitive prices are even stronger when one recognizes that 
Google derives 97% of its revenue from advertising, and thus would not 
want to sacriﬁ  ce website trafﬁ  c by charging high book prices. 
64    
  In fact, the settlement is even more procompetitive, because it assures 
consumers of competitive pricing for books sold through the new Google 
platform by allowing rightsholders to set their own prices on that platform 
and by requiring Google to set competitive prices. Thus, these provisions 
not only provide clear procompetitive beneﬁ  ts from the but-for world, but 
even provide consumers with the beneﬁ  ts of full book competition within 
the new Google option being added to that but-for world. 
  Fourth  , no anticompetitive effect can ﬂ  ow from any rightsholders’ ver-
tical agreements to the 63 percent royalty split that Google offers under 
the settlement. This royalty split cannot affect consumer pricing because 
it does not alter the incentives or algorithm for setting retail prices, but 
instead alters only the   distribution   of any resulting revenue. Each right-
sholder thus has incentives to set a price for its book that, given competi-
tion with other books, maximizes the revenue for that individual book, 
whether it gets 63% or any other share of that revenue, and the settlement 
algorithm requires Google to set prices in the same way. Thus, even if (con-
trary to fact) the settlement did ﬁ  x the royalty split, it would   not   “ o p e r a t e  
as a price ﬂ  oor,” as the initial DOJ brief incorrectly asserted, because the 
royalty split would neither alter nor set any ﬂ  oor on   competitively-set 
63      Even if we assume printed and digital books will prove to be in separate markets, which will 
not be clear until we learn more about the extent to which buyers will regard them as reason-
ably interchangeable, Google is unlikely to gain a large market share in digital books even with 
the settlement. The reason is that, given that the settlement by default gives Google no rights 
to distribute commercially available books and that those books generally are distributed by 
existing publishers, Google will primarily be selling books that are commercially unavailable 
because of limited consumer demand and that currently constitute less than 3% of all books 
sales.   See infra   at __. Further, unless new revenue models are approved, Google’s digital books 
will be readable only online,   see   Amended Settlement §§1.35, 1.77, 4.7, and thus may be less 
attractive than digital books through Kindle or Sony. There is thus little reason to think Google 
will gain a dominant market share or market power in any digital book market.   
64      Google Inc. Form 10-K at 42 (February 13, 2009).   
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consumer prices, and 63 percent of a competitively-set price with no ﬂ  oor 
cannot be a price ﬂ  oor. 
65  
  Moreover, the settlement in fact does not ﬁ  x the royalty split, but merely 
provides a default royalty that either party can reject and that cannot prevail 
if it does not match an efﬁ  cient distribution markup. Imagine that Google’s 
37% share turns out to too high a markup for its distribution efforts. Then 
any rightsholder could simply decline to sell its book through Google (with-
out even giving up Google display promotion) and instead sell its book at 
a Google rival that offers a lower distribution markup, which rightsholders 
would have every incentive to do if the distribution markup were excessive. 
Or the rightsholder could threaten to pull its book from Google and bargain 
with Google to sell the book through Google at a more attractive markup.  
 Now imagine instead that the 37% Google share turns out to be inefﬁ  cient-
ly low. Then Google would have every incentive to drop books unless they 
would agree to a lower royalty rate. The initial DOJ brief seemed to assume 
the settlement set a 63% ﬂ  oor on the royalty share that prohibited Google 
from demanding a higher distribution markup to carry books. 
66   Although 
this seems to me a misreading of the original settlement given Google’s right 
to drop books for “non-editorial reasons,” the amended settlement removes 
any doubt that Google can do so for commercially available books. 
67   Thus, if 
this were the basis for the DOJ’s objection, then that basis no longer applies. 
  Further, if a 37 percent distribution markup were inefﬁ  ciently low, then 
that means it would fail to induce an efﬁ  cient level of distribution effort, 
and thus rightsholders would also have incentives to raise it. Just like a man-
ufacturer in any vertical distributional restraint, rightsholders would want 
to increase the downstream share of proﬁ  ts in order to induce an efﬁ  cient 
level of distribution effort, and should agree to pay a higher share to Google 
or its rivals in order to induce or get commitments for more distribution 
effort. 
68   Settlement critics miss this point when they assert that no right-
sholder would ever have incentives to sell through a rival at a lower royalty 
65      Initial DOJ Brief at 19.   
66      Initial DOJ Brief at 19–20.   
67     Supra   note 55.   
68     Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,   551 U.S. 877, 896 (2007) (“A manufacturer 
has no incentive to overcompensate retailers with unjustiﬁ  ed margins. . . . As a general matter, 
therefore, a single manufacturer will desire to set minimum resale prices only if the ‘increase 
in demand resulting from enhanced service .  .  . will more than offset a negative impact on 
  demand of a higher retail price.’”); Elhauge 2008b, 441–442.   
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rate. 
69   Rightsholders would have incentives to pay more for distribution 
services whenever that would get them more efﬁ  cient distribution, thus in-
creasing their book sales enough to offset the higher distribution fee. 
  In any event, to the extent rightsholders would not pay more than 
37 percent for distribution because that is what Google offers under the set-
tlement, this does not mean the rightsholders have horizontally agreed to 
pay no more than 37 percent. It simply means that the 37 percent distribu-
tion fee that Google is individually offering has driven the market price for 
distribution, much like the price individually offered by any marginal seller 
might drive the market price for any good or service, leaving independent 
buyers without any incentive to pay more than the market price. Offering 
a low price for distribution or anything else is not predatory as long as that 
price is above cost, 
70  and no one claims that 37 percent results in below-cost 
pricing for Google’s distribution services. Nor would the answer be any 
different if we instead view Google as buying books and reselling them: the 
price Google is individually willing to pay for book licenses might drive their 
market price, but paying an excessive price for book licenses would not be 
predatory unless it resulted in below-cost pricing in the downstream book 
market, which again no one claims here. 
71   Indeed, it would be implausible 
to claim below-cost pricing for either distribution or books given the low 
incremental cost of distributing digital books and the fact that rightsholder 
incentives and the settlement algorithm require setting downstream book 
prices that maximize individual book revenue. However one categorizes 
the transaction, Google would have no incentive to accept a lower distribu-
tion fee or pay a higher royalty than it could have accepted/paid through 
separate negotiations with rightsholders, and if Google is undercharging/
overpaying with a 37/63% split, it would be equally able to do so without 
any settlement by publicly offering that split. 
  Fifth,   the agreements here are less restrictive than the usual set of agree-
ments between authors and an individual publisher. In the typical publish-
ing agreement, unlike here, the authors agree (1) to exclusivity, so that rival 
publishers cannot distribute the same book, and (2) to have their prices set 
by a common publisher, who is under no obligation to set prices to mimic 
competition among its book offerings and faces no constraint from authors 
69      Initial DOJ Brief at 19–20; Picker 2009c, 408.    
70      Brooke Group Ltd. (Liggett) v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).   
71     Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc,   127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007).   
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free to set their own book prices. For such standard publishing contracts, the 
fact that many authors may agree to the prices and royalty rates offered by the 
publisher, perhaps in a standard form contract sent to all authors, is deemed 
neither horizontal nor otherwise problematic. Given that such publishing 
contracts are more restrictive of competition than the prospective agreements 
that would result from the settlement, the latter should raise no concern. 
  3.3. In-Copyright Books That Are Commercially Unavailable 
  Clarifying  Rights.  Just as for commercially available books, the settlement 
provides a process for making decisions when it is unclear whether the au-
thor or publisher has digital rights over commercially unavailable books. In 
addition, as Part II showed, the settlement clariﬁ  es who has any rights to 
commercially unavailable books by resolving reversion issues, by funding 
a Registry to identify rightsholders, by giving rightsholders incentives to 
come forward, and by making this information available in a public data-
base. Such clariﬁ  cation has no anticompetitive downside, but several pro-
competitive effects. It procompetitively makes it easier for Google and its 
rivals to license these books for digital or non-digital sale. (It also decreases 
the transaction costs of obtaining licenses for a myriad of other purposes, 
like making a movie or derivative work based on a book.) Without the set-
tlement, unclaimed books would likely go unutilized because, compared to 
the small rewards from publication, the costs of identifying rightsholders 
are too high and the risk of penalties for violating copyright law by not 
getting a license are too great (U.S. Copyright Ofﬁ  ce 2006, 1). The settle-
ment can thus only increase the output of commercially unavailable books, 
especially since by deﬁ  nition commercially unavailable books are books for 
which there would be no new output absent the settlement.  
  Allowing  Book  Searches.   The settlement allows a digitization of commer-
cially unavailable books that makes them searchable and easier for readers 
to ﬁ  nd, unless the rightsholder removes the book from the database. The 
terms for doing so are the same as the terms for commercially available 
books, but the effects are even more procompetitive because commercially 
unavailable books are by deﬁ  nition currently not advertised and thus dif-
ﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd. Making these commercially unavailable books searchable on 
Google vastly increases the ability of potential readers to identify and locate 
the books they want, dramatically increasing the output of these books. 
    Allowing Display and Nonexclusive Sale Through Google.   The settlement 
terms for displaying and selling commercially unavailable books through 
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Google are much the same as those for commercially available books with 
two exceptions: (1) by default commercially unavailable books can be dis-
played and sold by Google, 
72   and (2) rightsholders who choose to allow 
Google to offer consumer purchases of commercially unavailable books 
must also allow Google to include those books in institutional subscrip-
tions. 
73   The other terms described above for commercially available books 
are all equally applicable to commercially unavailable books. Thus, rightsh-
olders of commercially unavailable books can (1) remove their book from 
Google display or sale, (2) choose whatever price they want for sale of their 
book through Google, (3) sell through a Google rival instead of, or in addi-
tion to, selling through Google, or (4) bargain with Google for a different 
royalty than the default 63%.  
 As with commercially available books, these provisions procompetitively 
add a new valuable promotional vehicle for buyers to identify the books 
they want and obtain them from Google or other sources. But the effects 
are even more procompetitive on commercially unavailable books because, 
for them, these provisions makes books commercially available that, by def-
inition, would otherwise be commercially unavailable. To be sure, there is a 
used book market for commercially unavailable books. But the used book 
market is limited, constituting 3% of regular book sales, only a subset of 
which are also both commercially unavailable and in-copyright. 
74   It is also 
hard to ﬁ  nd books on the used-book market because there is no common 
database of used books; the settlement would dramatically increase accessi-
bility by allowing online searches, previews, and purchases of commercially 
unavailable books. Finally, unlike the settlement, the used book market 
cannot produce any new copies of these books. The settlement thus clearly 
and sharply increases new output of commercially unavailable books from 
a but-for baseline of zero.  
72      Amended Settlement §3.2(b) (making all commercially unavailable books “display” by de-
fault); §3.3(a) (“Google may make Display Uses and Non-Display Uses of all Display Books”); 
§1.52 (“display uses” includes “access uses”); §1.1 (“access uses” means “Institutional Subscrip-
tions, Consumer Purchase and the Public Access Service”).   
73      Amended Settlement §3.5(b)(iii).    
74      Total non-textbook sales were $21 billion in 2004, of which used book sales represented $600 
million, or three percent.   See   Book Industry Study Group 2006. For textbooks, used book sales 
made up 30 percent of sales, or $1.6 billion out of $5.3 billion, but given the need to update 
textbooks with developing academic knowledge, these probably are not usually commercially 
unavailable books, but rather are used copies of commercially available books that the profes-
sor has assigned for a class and are resold by students from prior classes.   
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 As with commercially available books, settlement critics have argued that 
anticompetitive cartel pricing is created by the provisions allowing Google 
to set book prices (if the rightsholder declines to do so) and setting a default 
royalty (if the parties do not renegotiate). 
75   To consider this argument, it is 
convenient to separate the discussion of claimed and unclaimed books. 
  Currently Claimed Books. For commercially unavailable books with cur-
rently known rightsholders, the critics’ argument fails for all the reasons 
noted above for commercially available books. It fails for the same reasons 
that: (1) there is no horizontal agreement but instead a series of vertical 
agreements by some individual rightsholders to accept the standard settle-
ment pricing and royalties (here by declining to reject them); (2) the settle-
ment pricing algorithm actually mimics competitive pricing; (3) any effort 
to set supracompetitive pricing would be undercut by rightsholders setting 
a lower price through Google or its rivals; (4) the default royalty split can-
not affect prices and any inefﬁ  cient royalty split could not be maintained; 
and (5) the arrangements are no more horizontal and less restrictive than 
a series of agreements with a publisher that uses a standard form contract 
that applies unless the author opts out of it. 
  But here the critique also fails for a powerful additional reason: new out-
put of commercially unavailable books would remain zero but for the set-
tlement because commercially unavailable books are, by deﬁ  nition, books 
with zero output outside the settlement. This fact means that the price for 
new output of commercially unavailable books would exceed anyone’s will-
ingness to pay given the thin demand and relevant economies of scale in 
publishing. Even if one thought the settlement would allow monopoly pric-
ing for commercially unavailable books, such pricing would necessarily be 
at levels that many are willing to pay and thus would be below this but-for 
price and increase output from zero to something. These are unambiguous 
procompetitive effects from the proper but-for baseline. 
  This same factor also undermines the argument that default terms on 
prices and royalties amount to horizontal price-ﬁ  xing among rightsholders. 
The Initial DOJ Brief reasoned otherwise because “Class representatives— 
who compete with each other—collectively negotiated these pricing terms 
on behalf of all rightsholders.” 
76   But commercially unavailable books by 
75      Initial DOJ Brief at 17–22; Amazon Initial Brief at 1, 18–24, 30; Yahoo Initial Brief at 22–23; 
Fraser 2009, 15–17; Picker 2009c, 383, 385, 398, 408.   
76      Initial DOJ Brief at 18.   
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deﬁ  nition do   not   “compete with each other.” They don’t compete with any-
one because they are not offered for sale at all. Given that they are not—and 
would not be—horizontal competitors, any agreement among them cannot 
be a horizontal agreement. Restraining competition among persons who 
would offer no product absent the restraint does not restrain any horizontal 
competition—it creates some horizontal competition that otherwise would 
not exist, not only among those persons, but between them and others. 
  The Initial DOJ Brief seemed to doubt that the settlement was necessary 
to offer commercially unavailable books, pointing out that many digital 
books were already available for purchase, including “growing numbers of 
out-of-print books.” 
77   But, as noted above, this ignores the fact that com-
mercially unavailable books are, by deﬁ  nition, books that   will not   be avail-
able for purchasing from another source, and thus any out-of-print books 
that in the future are available for digital purchase from another source 
would not, during the time of any such availability, be deemed commer-
cially unavailable by the settlement, and thus would not be covered by any 
default license. Instead, such books would become commercially available, 
and the settlement would by default have their rightsholders reject any set-
tlement terms on pricing and royalties. The settlement makes these books 
saleable only because the default licenses lower transaction costs and allow 
them to offered as part of near-universal libraries. The Initial DOJ Brief 
asserted that such default licenses did not seem reasonably necessary to 
  offer these commercially unavailable books. 
78   But if default licenses are not 
necessary to offer these books, then rivals will offer these books without 
such default licenses, and they will no longer be commercially unavailable 
and covered by the settlement’s default license. 
  At worst, one might say that this sort of agreement had mixed horizontal-
  vertical features. If so, then the most relevant precedent are cases involv-
ing dual distribution agreements, which make clear that even though 
such agreements have horizontal aspects, their classiﬁ  cation should not 
turn on arid formalisms, but rather on a substantive assessment about 
whether the agreement is likely to have pernicious anticompetitive effects 
with no redeeming procompetitive virtue. 
79   Given that here there can be 
77      Initial DOJ Brief at 20.   
78      Initial DOJ Brief at 22.   
79     Copy-Data Systems v. Toshiba America,   663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981);   Abadir & Co. v. First 
 Mississippi  Corp.,   651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981).   
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no anticompetitive effect on books that otherwise would be commercially 
  unavailable, and powerful procompetitive effects to making them available, 
the settlement provisions on pricing claimed commercially unavailable 
books should clearly be characterized as vertical. 
  Indeed, even if the agreement were properly classiﬁ  ed as involving a hor-
izontal price-ﬁ  xing agreement,   BMI   makes clear that, if ancillary to a pro-
ductive joint venture, such an agreement must be assessed under the rule 
of reason. 
80   Here, the default terms on prices and royalties are clearly ancil-
lary to a productive joint venture in offering for sale books that, without 
such default licenses, would not be commercially available at all, let alone 
available in a near-universal library that makes the collection of books of-
fered more valuable. As shown in Part IV, the procompetitive effects of this 
settlement are quite similar to those in   BMI  : in both cases, the agreements 
created the new product of a blanket license in copyrighted works (here 
books, there songs) and lowered transaction costs to licensing those songs 
without taking away any but-for option of individual transactions outside 
intermediary. That was sufﬁ  cient to sustain the BMI agreement under the 
rule of reason. But the settlement here is even more procompetitive than 
the one in BMI because the settlement here also allows: (1) individual sales 
by the intermediary, which was the remedy sought by the BMI plaintiff, 
(2) rightsholders to set their own price for sales through the intermediary, 
a competitive right not even dreamed of in BMI, and (3) rightsholders who 
sell through one intermediary to sell the same work through rival inter-
mediaries, something that was afﬁ  rmatively prohibited in the agreements 
sustained in BMI. 
  Currently Unclaimed Books  .   For currently unclaimed books, we can fur-
ther divide them into two subgroups: those who would become claimed 
after the settlement and those that would not. Let’s start with the former 
group. Because the settlement funds a Registry to identify rightsholders 
and gives them incentives to self-identify, many of these currently un-
claimed books will become claimed. For their books, the procompetitive 
effects will include all those noted above for claimed books. In addition, 
the settlement will have the procompetitive effect of making these books 
available for licensing by Google rivals that might wish to either take ad-
vantage of low digital distribution costs to offer their own digital versions 
80     BMI v. CBS,   441 U.S. 1 (1979).   See generally   Elhauge 2008b, 50–51, 141 explaining when 
 horizontal  price-ﬁ  xing is covered by the rule of reason.   
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or respond to a demonstration of surprising demand for some of these 
books by   republishing a printed version. This will reduce the effective roy-
alty rate for licensing these currently unclaimed books from inﬁ  nity, and 
will   increase the licensing of these books from zero to something.  
  It seems likely that at least 80% of currently unknown rightsholders 
could be located by the Registry because a recent study by the Carnegie 
Mellon University Library indicates that approximately 80 percent of right-
sholders can be located and induced to respond using letters alone (Covey 
2005, 13). The actual percentage is likely higher because the Registry could 
engage in more extensive efforts, and because the settlement will create 
an easy and salient online site for rightsholders to identify themselves and 
pay royalties that give them strong incentives to do so. Thus, for currently 
unclaimed books, the effects will be unambiguously procompetitive for at 
least 80 percent of them and probably for far more. 
  For the (less than 20 percent of) currently unclaimed books that 
would remain unclaimed despite Registry searches and incentives for 
self- identiﬁ   cation, the results are also unambiguously procompetitive. 
These books are effectively not only unclaimed but unclaimable given the 
  relevant rewards and costs for making a claim. In the but-for world, such 
unclaimable books would be both commercially unavailable and unlicens-
able. Their output would be zero, and their effective royalty rate would be 
 inﬁ  nity. Further, without a class action settlement, this would be true in any 
conceivable but-for world because if these rightsholders cannot be identi-
ﬁ  ed with this settlement, they are almost certainly unidentiﬁ  able through 
any feasible means. The settlement thus clearly increases the output of these 
unclaimable books from zero and reduces their effective price and royalty 
rate from inﬁ  nity. 
  The Initial DOJ Brief argued that a default license covering prices and 
royalties was not reasonably necessary to sell commercially unavailable 
books.  81   But the DOJ offered no explanation of how, without some de-
fault terms on prices and royalties, one could ever offer unclaimed books, 
given that by deﬁ  nition there is no known rightsholder to negotiate with on 
them. Indeed, the DOJ’s claim that such a default license was not reason-
ably necessary was inconsistent with the DOJ’s other claim that rivals could 
never offer unclaimed books without such a default license. 
82  
81      Initial DOJ Brief at 20, 22.   
82      Initial DOJ Brief at 23.   
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  To be sure, given that the rightsholders of unclaimable books would re-
main unknown, their rightsholders could not individually set prices through 
Google or decide to license rivals to undercut any monopoly pricing through 
Google. However, when setting prices for unclaimed books, Google must 
use the same competition-mimicking algorithm used for claimed books. 
83  
Pricing for unclaimed books will thus be constrained by the direct terms of 
the competition-mimicking algorithm. In addition, the fact that the   same  al-
gorithm must be used for both claimed and unclaimed books means that 
any attempt to misuse the algorithm to set supracompetitive prices for un-
claimed books will be constrained by all the market forces (described above) 
that would prevent supracompetitive algorithm pricing for claimed books, 
including the fact that rightsholders of claimed books would undercut any 
supracompetitive algorithm prices. Given that over 97 percent of the revenue 
comes from commercially available books (which are all claimed), 
84   and at 
least 80 percent of currently unclaimed books will likely become claimed, 
85  
this means that over 99 percent of all book revenue will come from claimed 
books, even without adjusting for the share of commercially unavailable 
books that are already claimed. Google could not plausibly be tempted to use 
supracompetitive prices that lose it market share in more than 99 percent of 
the market in order to increase proﬁ  ts in less than 1 percent of the market. 
  Several other factors would also constrain Google from trying to mis-
use the competitive-pricing algorithm to set supracompetitive prices for 
unclaimed books.   First  , unclaimed books compete with claimed books. If 
claimed books, which form over 99 percent of the market, are being priced 
competitively, it is unlikely that supracompetitive prices can be charged for 
unclaimed books, especially because the main reason the latter will be un-
claimed is that there is little demand for them. 
  Second  , Google makes 97 percent of its revenue from advertising. 
86  
Supracompetitive pricing on unclaimed books that reduced trafﬁ  c to its 
site would thus likely lose Google more advertising revenue than it could 
gain in sales.  
  Third  , if Google tried to set supracompetitive prices on unclaimed books, 
that would strongly increase the incentives of their rightsholders to identify 
83    Amended  Settlement  §4.2(b).  
84     Supra   at p. 43.   
85     Supra   at p. 47.   
86     Supra   at 39 and n. 34.   
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themselves to get their royalties. After all, rightsholders are typically unidenti-
ﬁ  ed because they are difﬁ  cult to locate, not because they are unaware that they 
hold copyrights. 
87   Thus, given the negligible costs of registering, one would 
expect them to do so if they could reap supracompetitive proﬁ  ts. If 63 percent 
of these proﬁ  ts are insufﬁ  cient to induce this effort by the rightsholders, those 
proﬁ  ts are likely negligible, and 37 percent of such negligible proﬁ  ts would 
certainly be insufﬁ  cient to induce Google to violate the algorithm to set exces-
sive pricing on unclaimed books, especially since excessive algorithm pricing 
risks not only the other 99 percent of the book market that is claimed, but also 
the search advertising revenue that provides 97 percent of Google’s proﬁ  ts. 
  Fourth  , to the extent that attempted supracompetitive pricing did not in-
duce unknown rightsholders to identify themselves, it might well induce some 
rivals to offer their books without a license, which would deter Google from 
attempting the supracompetitive pricing in the ﬁ  rst place. 
88   Normally, pub-
lishers are reluctant to sell any book without a copyright license, but the fact 
that these rightsholders have not bothered to register to earn supracompetitive 
proﬁ  ts suggests that they are unlikely to ﬁ  le copyright infringement cases ei-
ther, making the odds of copyright penalties low. The supracompetitive pricing 
would also increase the beneﬁ  ts of publishing without a license. Google would 
be particularly reluctant to induce this sort of rival competition because the 
rival could easily undercut Google given that the rival would not be paying 
any royalties: the rival could charge 37 percent of the price that Google charges 
and still earn the same proﬁ  t per book sale. To be sure, if a rival sold unclaimed 
books without a license, it might invite a class action lawsuit on behalf of un-
registered rightsholders. But if so, that brings us to the next constraint. 
87      United States Copyright Ofﬁ  ce,   Report on Orphan Works   22–34 (2006) (listing as reasons for 
orphan works difﬁ  culties in identifying and locating the rightsholders, not the unawareness of 
the rightsholders that they have copyrights).   
88      Acknowledging this factor does not imply any normative approval of such copying without a 
license. It is simply a positive observation about a factor that would constrain any feared su-
pracompetitive pricing, and to the extent the factor holds, the unlicensed copying would never 
occur because the mere threat of it would induce Google to lower prices enough to prevent it 
from occurring. Nor is the normative issue so clearcut. The situation involves rightsholders who 
by deﬁ  nition (1) stopped offering their books commercially, (2) cannot be identiﬁ  ed despite 
diligent search, and (3) have not come forward despite the public offering of their books on the 
Internet. Although the copyright interests of such rightsholders are not technically abandoned 
property, they come close enough that one might argue they deserve similar normative treat-
ment. In any event, even if one puts aside this factor out of distaste, all the other factors would 
still clearly sufﬁ  ce to constrain any supracompetitive pricing. It would also remain the case that 
the settlement actually does not constrain any form of competition that would exist without the 
settlement and that it in any event requires competitive pricing within the settlement as well.   
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  Fifth  , supracompetitive pricing for unclaimed books would to some ex-
tent be constrained by the ability of Google rivals to obtain similar default 
licensing rights for these books through the same class action mechanism. 
Settlement critics argue that provoking such a second class action lawsuit 
would be prohibitively risky. 
89   But the risks would seem lower than those 
incurred by Google, even if the same digitization were done, because at 
that time there was no precedent for such a settlement. The rival could 
further lower its risks by limiting its digitization to unclaimed books. Given 
that the affected rightsholders would be unknown, it would seem difﬁ  cult 
to ﬁ  nd named plaintiffs for such a class and also difﬁ  cult to get a court to 
award monetary recovery when there is no way to identify who would re-
ceive the damages. If the rival’s digitization did not provoke a second class 
action, then the rival would effectively get free rights to the same books 
that Google pays 63 percent to sell. This possible payoff may well be worth 
any ﬁ  nancial risk, especially because if the rival digitization did provoke a 
second class action, then the rival could settle on terms that gave it the same 
sort of default license over unclaimed books that Google obtained. 
  Settlement critics argue that the plaintiffs in a second class action would 
be unlikely to give the rival as good a settlement as Google got (Samuelson 
2009a; Picker 2009c, 405). But their argument seems to presuppose that the 
second class action would be controlled by the same group that brought 
the ﬁ  rst. This is not clear. A rival class action might well involve different 
groups and the creation of a second Registry or Fiduciary, which would 
have incentives to settle on terms that licensed the rival at prices that under-
cut Google because then the rival would gain market share and pay more 
into the second Registry or Fiduciary.  
 Even if rightsholders in the rival’s class action were represented by the ﬁ  rst 
Registry and Fiduciary, they would have incentives to undercut any supra-
competitive retail pricing in a settlement licensing the rival, because doing 
so would minimize the distribution markup. To see why, suppose Google 
were on average charging a supracompetitive retail price of $10 for un-
claimed books when the competitive price would be $5. Then   rightsholders 
would be receiving $6.30 per book sale from Google, and thus a Fiduciary 
representing them should be happy to charge $6.30 per book to a rival that 
charged consumers $9 instead. The Fiduciary would have incentives to do 
89     Supra   at p. 14.   
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so because at a lower downstream price, more books would be sold and thus 
the   rightsholders would receive $6.30 per book on more book sales. 
  Indeed, as noted above, the settlement authorizes the Registry and 
Fiduciary to license rivals “the extent permitted by law.” 
90   If this gives them 
authority to grant default licenses to rivals, they would have similar incen-
tives to license Google rivals to reduce any supracompetitive pricing. The 
ability to license rivals will thus constrain the distribution markup to the 
extent 37 percent is too high a distribution fee. It will also constrain book 
pricing because, given that Google is paid a percentage of book revenue, any 
supracompetitive book price would result in a supracompetitive distribu-
tion markup that the Fiduciary would have incentives to undercut, just like 
any upstream manufacturer facing a supracompetitive distribution   markup. 
Moreover, because a rival who undercuts Google’s prices would lower 
Google’s market share, Google would have strong incentives never to engage 
in supracompetitive pricing that induces the Fiduciary to license rivals. 
  Sixth  , even if (contrary to fact) the settlement   did   allow monopoly pric-
ing over unclaimable books, the settlement would still be procompetitive 
because one market option is better than none and monopoly pricing is 
better for consumer welfare than no market at all. The but-for alternative 
for unclaimable books is no licensing at all, which produces the anticom-
petitive output of zero and effective prices and royalty rates of inﬁ  nity on 
new output. Even monopoly pricing would necessarily increase output and 
lower effective prices and royalty rates from that but-for baseline. One must 
also keep in mind that unclaimable books comprise a very small share of the 
overall market and will continue to shrink if the settlement is approved. 
  3.4. Institutional Subscriptions to View All Google Books 
  The settlement also procompetitively creates a brand-new product—the 
institutional subscription—under which universities, schools, corpora-
tions, governments, and other institutions can buy blanket licenses to ac-
cess all commercially unavailable books that are available for consumer 
purchase through Google, as well as any commercially available books the 
relevant rightsholders choose to include in the institutional subscription. 
91  
90     Supra   at pp. 5, 11–12 and 24.   
91      Amended Settlement §4.1(a)(v) (institutional subscription includes all books available for 
such subscriptions); §3.5(b)(iii) (commercially unavailable books available for consumer pur-
chase must also be available for institutional subscription, but commercially available books 
need not be).   
 
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
4
,
 
2
0
1
3
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 52 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
 Rightsholders can withdraw their books from the institutional subscription 
if they wish and, as always, remain free to directly license or sell their books 
to anyone who prefers that option to the institutional subscription. In addi-
tion to selling institutional subscriptions, Google must provide free access 
to them at one or more terminals at each college and public library. 
92    
  Creating this new product is a huge procompetitive beneﬁ  t that could 
not exist absent the settlement. Nondigital technology simply does not per-
mit a book supplier to sell blanket access to millions of volumes. Nor would 
any vaguely comparable existing product—such as, hypothetically, paid ac-
cess to a university library—allow large numbers of users to simultaneously 
search through or annotate these products with comparable ease. Such in-
stitutional subscriptions promise to be an enormous boon to researchers, 
allowing them to delve into books freely before knowing how valuable the 
books may be to their research and without being deterred by any marginal 
monetary or transaction costs. 
 Settlement critics object that Google and the Registry will have a monopoly 
over such institutional subscriptions, and thus will be able to charge a monop-
oly price. But this concern is misplaced for several reasons.  First , the settlement 
requires that institutional subscriptions be priced to achieve two objectives: 
  (1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each Book and license on 
behalf of Rightsholders and (2) the realization of broad access to the Books 
by the public, including institutions of higher education. 
93  
 The  ﬁ  rst objective requires that revenue be realized at “market” rates for 
“each” book, and thus requires that pricing achieve only competitive  market 
returns, just like the competitive-pricing algorithm does for  individual con-
sumer purchases. The second objective reinforces this goal by requiring that 
pricing be low enough to realize “broad access” by the public. If the price 
were raised to a high enough level that a substantial number of institutions 
decided to refrain from subscribing, Google will be obligated to lower the 
price to achieve broad access. In essence, this requirement bars any mono-
poly or supracompetitive pricing that would create allocative   inefﬁ  ciency 
92      The Amended Settlement itself says Google “may” provide one terminal per 4,000 students at 
two-year colleges, one terminal per 10,000 students at four-year colleges, and one terminal per 
public library or more than one if the Registry so authorizes. Amended Settlement §4.8(a)(i). 
However, in a separate agreement Google has contractually committed to provide this au-
thorized public access service within two years.   See   Amendment to Cooperative Agreement 
(Between Google and the University of Michigan) Attachment A, at §3(a) (May 19, 2009).   
93    Amended  Settlement  §4.1(a)(i).  
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in terms of some signiﬁ  cant set of buyers not taking the output. Instead, 
institutional subscriptions must be priced low enough to produce the sort 
of broad access that is consistent with the market output that would exist 
with competitive pricing.  
  To the extent that this provision were at all ambiguous on these points, 
if interpreting the provision to allow setting supracompetitive prices would 
create an antitrust violation, then standard canons of contractual construc-
tion would require reading the provision to avoid that illegality. 
94   Indeed, 
even if interpreting the provision to allow supracompetitive prices were not 
illegal, then contractual canons would require reading the term to maxi-
mize competition and further the public interest. 
95  
  Some settlement critics argue that the “broad access” requirement would 
not constrain monopoly pricing because demand for these institutional 
subscriptions would be “completely inelastic” (Darnton 2009a). But this 
assertion is implausible. Institutions have many demands on their funds 
and would not be willing to pay an inﬁ  nite price for institutional subscrip-
tions, particularly because they can turn to substitutes that include not only 
current libraries and interlibrary loan, but also the free terminals provided 
under the settlement and the option of buying individual books through 
Google. Indeed, libraries today often decline to buy many books, thus 
conﬁ  rming that their demand for books is not completely inelastic, and 
most of the books covered by the institutional subscriptions will likely be 
books the libraries declined to buy. 
96   In any event, even if the “broad access” 
94     Walsh v. Schlecht,   429 U.S. 401, 408 (1977) (“ambiguously worded contracts should not be 
interpreted to render them illegal and unenforceable where the wording lends itself to a logi-
cally acceptable construction that renders them legal and enforceable.”);   Nat'l Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Local 32B-32J Serv. Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO,   353 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir.2003) 
(same); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1981) (“[A]n interpretation which 
gives a . . . lawful . . . meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a 
part . . . unlawful . . . .”).   
95      Restatement (Second) of Contracts §207 (1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable mean-
ings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is 
generally preferred.”); Farnsworth 2004, vol. 2, §7.11, 304 (“if the language is reasonably sus-
ceptible to two interpretations and only one favors the public interest, this interpretation will 
be preferred.”);   Atlanta Center Ltd. v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,   848 F.2d 146, 148 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(when a contractual term “is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the pre-
ferred interpretation is the one that least restricts competition, thereby posing the least affront 
to the public policy.”);  Herrera v. Katz Communications,  532 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“a meaning which serves the public interest . . . is preferred over a meaning which does not”).   
96     See   Norman Oder 2008, explaining that public libraries face budget constraints;  see also   Daniel 
Clancy 2009, noting that institutional subscriptions will provide libraries with access to “mil-
lion of additional books.”   
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requirement did not constrain pricing, the requirement that revenue be 
  limited to competitive market returns for each book would.  
  Some settlement critics also object that (1) the Amended Settlement 
terms “don’t create a mechanism to control any monopoly power” over 
institutional subscriptions (Picker 2009b, 2), or that the mechanisms that 
they do create are enforceable only by the Registry, which (critics claim) has 
no incentive to object to high prices. 
97   But both claims are simply untrue. 
The Settlement provides that “all disputes between and among Google, 
Rightsholders, Claimants, the Registry and Participating Libraries arising 
out of this Settlement Agreement” are subject to arbitration, and it explic-
itly states that arbitration shall apply to disputes regarding the pricing of 
institutional subscriptions. 
98   Any individual rightsholder thus clearly has 
standing to challenge any high institutional subscription price in arbitra-
tion, which is likely to be the case for at least one rightsholder because many 
are ideologically committed to free access and many others would simply 
have incentives to broaden access to their works if (like most academics 
with university press books) they care more about being read than about 
the paltry royalties they are likely to get. Further, while the settlement itself is 
ambiguous about whether university libraries can bring such a challenge, 
99  
subsequent agreements make clear that universities can bring arbitration 
if Google tries to charge university subscription fees that   violate these 
97      Darnton 2009a (“Only the registry, acting for the copyright holders, has the power to force 
a change in the subscription prices charged by Google, and there is no reason to expect the 
registry to object if the prices are too high”).   
98      Amended Settlement §§ 9.1(a), 9.3(e)(iii).   
99    The  settlement  deﬁ  nes “participating libraries” to mean “Fully Participating Libraries, Coop-
erating Libraries, Public Domain Libraries and Other Libraries,” Amended Settlement §1.103, 
so all of them have standing to arbitrate if they have a dispute “arising out of this Amended 
Settlement Agreement.” § 9.1(a). However, it is not clear whether these libraries have rights 
arising out of the settlement to enforce §4.1(a)’s requirements for institutional subscription 
pricing, because the libraries are not parties to the settlement agreement and the settlement 
provides a list of the provisions for which libraries are third-party beneﬁ  ciaries that does not 
include §4.1(a).    See   §7.2(f). Arguably §7.2(f) excludes by implication library third-party ben-
eﬁ  ciary status under §4.1(a), although one could instead read §7.2(f) to clarify the provisions 
for which libraries deﬁ  nitely had this status without resolving which other provisions might 
also confer that status.   See   Elhauge 2008a, 189–190, noting that courts sometimes apply the 
  expressio unius   canon that listing some applications excludes unlisted applications and other 
times hold that listed applications can include unlisted ones by analogy, and some reasons 
supporting the latter.   
 
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
4
,
 
2
0
1
3
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 Spring 2010: Volume 2, Number 1  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  55  
 requirements. 
100   Universities would have clear strong incentives to bring 
such challenges to minimize the fees they must pay. Outside of arbitration, 
the provision limiting subscription pricing might also be enforceable in 
court by nonuniversity institutions or the general public on the theory that 
they are intended third-party beneﬁ  ciaries of that provision. 
101   Such an in-
tent to beneﬁ  t could be grounded in the fact that the provision explicitly 
lists the need to provide the “public” with broad access and seems explicitly 
designed to protect institutions from high subscription fees. 
102  Again, to the 
extent there was any ambiguity, the settlement must be interpreted to avoid 
antitrust illegality and favor the public interest. 
  Second  , any attempt to violate this provision and charge excessive insti-
tutional subscription fees would be constrained by other forces. To begin 
with, it would be constrained by Google’s own incentives to keep fees low 
in order to promote its brand and encourage use of its search engine, from 
which it reaps the advertising revenue that provides 97 percent of its proﬁ  ts. 
In addition, high subscription prices would to be constrained by compe-
tition from free library terminals, the ability to purchase books through 
Google or other sources, and the fact that rightsholders retain the right to 
directly license or sell their books whether or not those books are included 
in the institutional subscriptions. The last constraint is particularly signiﬁ  -
cant legally because, as we shall see, precisely that sort of constraint was 
deemed sufﬁ  cient to eliminate anticompetitive effects in   BMI.  
 High subscription fees would also be constrained by the prospect of rivals 
offering their own institutional subscriptions at lower rates. Rightsholders 
will be just as able as Google to obtain licenses for commercially available 
100     Amendment to Cooperative Agreement (Between Google and the University of Michigan) At-
tachment A (May 19, 2009), at §1(d) (deﬁ  ning an “interested institution” to include any fully 
participating or cooperating library); §3.c (allowing any “interested institution” to challenge 
university subscription rates).   
101     Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981); Farnsworth 1990, § 10.3.   
102   Cutting the other way is the fact that the the settlement deﬁ  nes third-party beneﬁ  ciary rights for 
libraries but not other institutions, Amended Settlement §7.2(f), which one could say excludes 
by implication any intent to beneﬁ  t other institutions. However, the provision could equally 
be read to simply clarify the extent to which libraries are deﬁ  nitely third-party beneﬁ  ciaries 
without resolving whether and when other institutions might also be intended beneﬁ  ciaries.   
  See supra   note 99 (noting mixed application of the   expressio unius   canon). Supporting the latter 
interpretation is the Restatement, which provides “It is not essential to the creation of a right in 
an intended beneﬁ  ciary that he be identiﬁ  ed when a contract containing the promise is made.” 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 308 (1981). Here the institutions and public were in 
fact identiﬁ  ed, though their third-party beneﬁ  ciary status was not explicitly   identiﬁ  ed.   
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 56 ~ Elhauge:  Why the Google Books Settlement is procompetitive
books and journals, which are what institutions mainly buy. 
103   Rivals who 
wanted to offer an institutional subscription of comparable scope could 
also seek licenses for any commercially unavailable books, which (as de-
scribed above) the settlement makes easier in several ways.   (A)  The  settle-
ment creates a public database that makes it easy for rivals to make a mass 
offer to all registered rightsholders to license their books.  (B)  The settlement 
allows the Registry to collect licenses from multiple registered rightshold-
ers and license them in aggregate to rivals, which the Registry and rightsh-
olders have incentives to do.   (C)   The settlement might be read to provide 
the Registry and Fiduciary with authority to license books to rivals absent 
rightsholder objection, in which case they could grant rivals precisely the 
same default rights over all commercially unavailable books that Google 
has, and would have incentives to do so.   (D)   The settlement provides a 
roadmap as to how rivals could engage in digitization to provoke a second 
class action and obtain similar default licenses for all commercially unavail-
able books. If the second class action were controlled by the same forces 
that control the Registry, they would have incentives to license the rival. If 
it were not, then the second set of class action plaintiffs would have clear 
incentives to license a rival and undercut the Google subscription price. 
 In short, if methods  (C)  and  (D)  prove feasible, a Google rival could obtain 
default rights over all commercially unavailable books—even if unclaimed—
and thus could offer precisely the same institutional subscription as Google. 
If methods   (C)   and   (D)   prove unfeasible, then the rival could not obtain 
licenses over unclaimed books, but unclaimed books currently provide only 
a fraction of commercially unavailable book revenue and will provide an 
even smaller fraction once the settlement lowers the number of unclaimed 
books. Thus, even if   (C)   and   (D)   prove unfeasible, the rival institutional sub-
scription could be a close substitute for the Google subscription, and indeed 
could be more attractive than Google’s subscription if the rival offers more 
  commercially available books, lower prices, or additional features. 
  Third,   even if the critics were right both that the settlement gives Google 
the power to price institutional subscriptions at monopoly levels and that ri-
vals could not possibly offer a similar competing subscription, the settlement 
would still be procompetitive because having one ﬁ  rm offer a desired prod-
uct is preferable to having no ﬁ  rm offer it. After all, if rivals cannot offer an 
103     See   Association of College and Research Libraries 2007, reporting that the bulk of library 
spending is on current periodicals.   
 
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
4
,
 
2
0
1
3
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 Spring 2010: Volume 2, Number 1  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  57  
institutional subscription, and the critics also succeed in making it impossible 
for Google to offer an institutional subscription by blocking this settlement, 
then no one will offer a similar institutional subscription. The but-for output 
of such subscriptions will thus be zero and the but-for price will effectively be 
inﬁ  nity. Even monopoly output and pricing would thus expand output and 
lower effective prices relative to the proper but-for baseline. Indeed, to the 
extent critics are right that this new product would be so attractive relative to 
alternative market options that demand for it would be completely inelastic, 
then that just underscores how harmful to consumer welfare it would be to 
deny buyers access to such a product by rejecting this settlement.  
  3.5. Other Procompetitive Beneﬁ  ts 
  The settlement also has several other profound procompetitive effects. 
  First  , under the settlement, Google intends to display books in such a way 
that users unable to read print will be able to access them to the same extent 
as users without any disability, and Google must provide displays that ac-
commodate their disabilities without charging them a higher price. 
104   For 
the 15–30 million Americans who are print-disabled, this will dramatically 
expand their access to written knowledge, perhaps more than anything 
since the invention of Braille. 
105   In the less evocative language of antitrust 
economics, this is an enormous increase in market output and consumer 
welfare for 5–10 percent of Americans. 
  Second  , Google will designate two research centers to house the digital 
copies of all books that it has scanned, and qualiﬁ  ed researchers will be 
given free access to these ﬁ  les in order to conduct “non-consumptive” re-
search, which is deﬁ  ned as research unrelated to the intellectual content of 
the works, such as developing search algorithms or conducting linguistic 
104     Under Amended Settlement §7.2(g), Google “intends” to display books in a way that satis-
ﬁ  es the §3.3(d) goal of providing the print-disabled a similar experience to the nondisabled 
and “must ... use commercially reasonable efforts to enable an Accommodated Service,” which 
includes displaying books “in the form of electronic text used in conjunction with screen en-
largement, voice output, and refreshable Braille displays . . . at no greater charge than the 
charge to view Books in a similar manner to users . . . without a Print Disability.”   
105     See   Reading Rights Coalition 2010, estimating that there are about 15 million print-disabled 
people in the United States; Council on Access to Information for Print-Disabled Canadians 
2000, estimating that 10 percent of Canadians are print-disabled, which would imply 30 mil-
lion are in the United States.   
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analyses. 
106   The creation of this research corpus will enable researchers in 
a variety of disciplines to conduct technical analyses across the universal 
library of books that would have been exponentially more difﬁ  cult, if not 
entirely impossible, absent the settlement. This, too, is in effect a new prod-
uct, and one that can lay the groundwork for new technologies in full-text 
searching, automated translation, and other areas of programming. 
  Third,  the settlement will provide a vast increase in the availability of hu-
man knowledge that is desirable for its own sake and promises to improve 
research to further advance knowledge. The net effect of the increased ac-
cessibility of each category of book—the uniformly positive effects, that 
is, which the settlement will have on consumers’ ability to locate and read 
books of all sorts—will be a quantitative and qualitative expansion of the 
information available online. Readers will be able to read many commer-
cially unavailable books that are currently either severely limited in their 
distribution or wholly unavailable.  Further, researchers will be able to per-
form online research to ﬁ  nd and analyze both commercially available and 
unavailable books that today are inaccessible online with the exception of 
a small portion of public domain works. This current online inaccessibility 
today means that relatively ephemeral information is privileged over long-
term, enduring knowledge. The settlement thus would not only increase 
the sheer amount of information online, by adding billions of pages of digi-
tized books, but also ameliorate this distortion in the kinds of information 
available online. Research would correspondingly improve, and every in-
dustry performing online research will enjoy efﬁ  ciency gains. This effect is 
augmented by Google’s agreement to provide free access to all books in its 
database at one or more terminals in libraries and colleges, which would al-
low large numbers of interested users to access the information at no cost. 
  4. THE SETTLEMENT COMPARES FAVORABLY TO THE 
BLANKET COPYRIGHT LICENSES APPROVED IN BMI 
  As Part 3 explained, the settlement does not involve a horizontal price-ﬁ  xing 
agreement because commercially unavailable books are not horizontal 
106     Amended Settlement §1.132 (“‘Research Corpus’ means a set of all Digital Copies of Books 
made in connection with the Google Library Project”); §7.2(d)(ii) (“The Research Corpus may 
be hosted at up to two Host Sites at any given time”); §7.2(d)(i) (“The Research Corpus may be 
created and used for Non-Consumptive Research”); §1.93 (“Categories of Non-Consumptive 
Research include . . . Image analysis and text extraction . . . Textual analysis and information 
extraction . . . Linguistic analysis . . . Automated Translation . . . Indexing and Search”).   
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competitors with any book and commercially available books presump-
tively   reject   any pricing terms under the settlement. But even if we thought 
the settlement did involve horizontal price-ﬁ  xing, the precedent closest to 
this case is   BMI v. CBS,   which involved copyrights to perform songs rather 
than to reproduce book content. In that case, as here, millions of rightsh-
olders provided copyright licenses to an intermediary, which in turn sold 
blanket licenses to users that combined all their copyrighted materials. The 
  Supreme Court held that this agreement was not per se illegal because it 
 furthered the procompetitive purposes of (1) lowering the transaction costs 
of identifying and negotiating with millions of individual rightsholders, and 
(2) creating a new product (the blanket license) that otherwise would not 
be possible. 
107   On remand, the Second Circuit held that the agreement sur-
vived the rule of reason because it lacked any anticompetitive effect, given 
that users remained free to directly license the songs from rightsholders. 
108  
This logic is all equally applicable to the settlement here. Indeed, the settle-
ment confers these procompetitive beneﬁ  ts and more, and is less restrictive 
of competition in several respects.  
  As in   BMI  , the settlement here both (1) lowers the transaction costs of 
identifying and negotiating with millions of rightsholders; and (2) cre-
ates a new product (a blanket license or institutional subscription) that 
otherwise would not be available. The initial DOJ brief disputed this par-
allel, arguing that the rightsholders here, unlike in   BMI  , have not shown 
that they could not sell their books without collective pricing. 
109   But the 
institutional subscription is a blanket license that by deﬁ  nition cannot 
be sold without a collective price, the settlement rejected collective pric-
ing for individual sales of commercially available books, and the default 
pricing for individual sales of commercially unavailable books permits 
sales of books that by deﬁ  nition would not otherwise be sold (includ-
ing unclaimed books that could not otherwise even be licensed for sale). 
Further, whereas in   BMI   the agreement achieved its procompetitive pur-
poses by simply grouping the rights in one intermediary that licensed 
those rights together, the settlement here not only accomplishes that feat, 
but additionally furthers these procompetitive purposes by clarifying 
rights and digitizing the copyrighted material in a way that makes it far 
107     BMI v. CBS,   441 U.S. 1 (1979).   
108     CBS v. ASCAP,   620 F.2d 930 (1980).   
109     Initial DOJ Brief at 19.   
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easier for users to locate and use the materials they want. Also as in   BMI , 
the settlement here does not bar direct purchases from the rightsholders 
and thus cannot impede competition among them. But in addition, the 
settlement here is less restrictive than the   BMI   arrangement in three other 
important respects.  
  First,  in   BMI   the intermediary offered a blanket license but not indi-
vidual songs. Indeed the whole case was about the intermediary’s refusal to 
sell songs separately, and the remedy sought by the plaintiff was an order 
directing the intermediary to sell songs individually. 
110   Under the settle-
ment here, Google is   already   committing to offer books both individually 
and in a blanket license. The Initial DOJ Brief oddly argues that provid-
ing the option of individual sale makes this settlement   less   procompetitive 
than   BMI , 
111   but it is hard to see how providing an additional market op-
tion (without taking away any) could be anticompetitive, especially when 
it provides the very option that the plaintiff sought as an antitrust remedy 
in   BMI  . The initial DOJ position amounts to forcing Google to tie the sale 
of books in one exclusive license rather than sell them separately, and while 
some argue that tying should be per se permissible, 
112   I don’t know of any-
one who contends it should be required. In any event, this DOJ argument 
presupposes that the terms by which Google sells books are anticompeti-
tive, a premise that was already rebutted in Part 3 and that the DOJ itself 
may no longer hold now that various settlement amendments have been 
made. 
113  
  One settlement critic takes the opposite tack of the DOJ, claiming that 
under the settlement Google would not extend the sale of individual books 
to institutions, which he argues is inconsistent with the fact that since 1941 
consent decrees have barred the   BMI   intermediaries from offering only 
110     441 U.S. at 18.   
111     Initial DOJ Brief at 18-19.   
112     See generally   Elhauge 2009b, discussing and rejecting this claim.   
113     The Inital DOJ Brief also distinguished   BMI   on the ground that here the rightsholders were 
collectively agreeing on the minimum royalty they would charge Google,   see   Initial DOJ Brief 
at19, but this argument was also already rebutted in Part III and the DOJ may no longer holder 
it now that the Amended Settlement explicitly provides that Google is not bound to pay the 
default royalty but can drop books whose rightsholders refuse to renegotiate it.   
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blanket licenses. 
114   But nothing in the settlement suggests Google could 
or would discriminate among purchasers of individual books based on 
whether they belonged to institutions. Google would presumably not allow 
an institution to purchase a book individually and then share it among all 
of its members, because that would be tantamount to buying multiple cop-
ies for the price of one. But prohibiting that sort of multiple usage would 
just provide a meaningful distinction between per-book and subscription 
purchases, and requiring licenses that permitted multiple usage of a single 
song was not the remedy sought in   BMI  . It is thus hard to see how the 
Google settlement could violate the antitrust laws when it not only meets 
the standards required by   BMI  , but even fulﬁ  lled the plaintiff demands that 
the   BMI   Court held were beyond antitrust requirements. 
  Second  , in   BMI   the rightsholders could set their own prices only by going 
outside the intermediary, which was costly. In contrast, here the settlement 
explicitly allows rightsholders not only to license directly, but also to set their 
own prices for sales through the intermediary for all individual book sales. 
115  
Thus, here the settlement procompetitively has the intermediary provide a 
clearinghouse for rightsholder competition that the   BMI   intermediary de-
clined to provide. It obviously is not possible for individual buyers to set 
their own prices for a blanket license (like the one in  BMI  or the institutional 
subscription here) because the collection of all their rights is what is being 
sold. However, in   BMI,   neither the Supreme Court nor the appellate court 
opinions found this troubling. To be sure, the   BMI   consent decree allowed a 
court to review whether blanket license prices were reasonable, as the Initial 
DOJ Brief stressed in trying to distinguish   BMI . 
116   But neither court in   BMI 
  relied on that aspect of the consent decree; instead, they relied on the fact 
that the consent decree preserved the option of buying directly from indi-
vidual rightsholders. 
117   The appellate court stressed that no anticompetitive 
114     Fraser 2009, 19. He refers to the fact that 1941 consent decree, as amended in 1950, required 
the intermediaries to offer per-program (but not per-song) licenses. 620 F.2d at 933. However, 
these licenses were rarely used and the Court did not hold that their existence was necessary 
to render the blanket license procompetitive. 441 U.S. at 11–12, 20. To the extent that per-
program licenses were relevant to the   BMI   result, the Google settlement provides the equiva-
lent in the form of discipline-based subscriptions.   See   Amended Settlement §4.1(a)(v). The 
settlement just goes even further in also providing for per-book sales that parallel the per-song 
licenses sought by the   BMI   plaintiff.  
115    Amended  Settlement  §4.2(b)(i)(1).  
116     Initial DOJ Brief §19.   
117     441 U.S. at 11–12, 23–24; 620 F.2d at 933, 935   
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effect ﬂ  owed from the fact that the plaintiff might prefer the blanket license 
to buying directly from individual rightsholders, as long as the plaintiff still 
had the latter choice. 
118   Adding the option of a blanket license to the option 
of direct licensing could not leave the plaintiff any worse off than it would 
have been without a blanket license, even if the blanket license might be so 
attractive that no one wants the direct licenses. Here the option of direct li-
censing provides even more of a constraint because buyers not only can buy 
directly from individual rightsholders, but also can buy individual books 
through the intermediary at a price each individual rightsholder can set.  
  Further, even if the reasonable-fee review were relevant to the   BMI  deci-
sions, an even stronger review is supplied here by the settlement provisions 
requiring that book and institutional subscription prices be set to earn only 
competitive returns and ensure broad access. The main difference is that 
the standard in this settlement is far more manageable because the compet-
itive prices for individual book sales (not available in   BMI  ) provides some 
metric to use when Google prices individual books or a blanket license, and 
the competitive returns and broad access tests provide a more objective 
benchmark than the reasonable-fee test used in the   BMI  consent  decrees. 
  Third,   although the   BMI   agreement was nonexclusive in the sense that 
the rightsholder retained the right to license itself directly, the agreement 
did   not   allow any intermediary member to license through a rival interme-
diary. 
119   Thus, in   BMI   the members did have to exclusively choose one in-
termediary, and could not sell their songs through multiple intermediaries 
118     620 F.2d at 935.   
119     United States v. BMI,   1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,141, at Consent Decree § VI.A.   
Settlement
Class
Google
ASCAP
Critic's Diagrams
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at the same time. In contrast, rightsholders here not only can license their 
books directly, but also remain free to license them both through Google 
and any Google rival at the same time. 
120   Thus, unlike in   BMI  , the settle-
ment here does not require any rightsholder to exclusively choose one in-
termediary. Further, here the Registry can assemble aggregations of book 
rights, and it and the Fiduciary can perhaps even license default rights over 
commercially unavailable books. They could then license rivals who wish to 
offer their own institutional subscriptions, even though Google is offering 
the same books. Thus, the procompetitive effects created by the ability of 
rightsholders in   BMI   to license directly are surpassed here by the ability of 
rightsholders to do not only that, but to also license Google rivals, and to 
have a Registry (and perhaps Fiduciary) that can license rivals in aggregate forms 
that can allow rivals to offer     institutional subscriptions of similar sweep. 
  One settlement critic asserts the contrary, that the   BMI   agreement is less 
restrictive because while the   BMI   rightsholders negotiated with ASCAP 
separately, the Google settlement rightsholders effectively agreed to have 
one party (their class counsel) collectively negotiate with Google for them 
(Fraser 2009, 14). Fraser illustrates his claimed difference with the follow-
ing two diagrams. 
        However, his diagrams fail to capture the actual set of rights and restric-
tions of the relevant rightsholders in numerous respects. First, his diagrams 
incorrectly depict the rightsholders as collectively agreeing to distribute 
through Google. In fact, each rightsholder individually decides whether it 
wants to sell through Google, and is free to change its mind at any time. 
121  
The relationship is thus no less vertical than in   BMI,   and arguably less so 
because in   BMI   the rightsholders agree to collectively form the ASCAP 
intermediary, 
122   whereas here the rightsholders did not form Google. 
Indeed, the   BMI   courts assumed the arrangement there constituted a hori-
zontal agreement, and resolved the case instead on the grounds that the 
rightsholders remained free to sell separately. Second, his diagrams incor-
rectly depict the rightsholders as collectively agreeing to have class counsel 
or Google set their prices. In fact, the rightsholders each retain the right to 
120    Amended  Settlement  §2.4.  
121     To the extent that Fraser’s comparison rests on Google’s agreement with unknown rightsh-
olders, his diagrams are inaccurate because unknown rightsholders could not have competed 
without a settlement. Indeed, because the new output of their books absent the settlement is 
zero, any agreement to license their books can only be procompetitive.   
122     441 U.S. at 4–5.   
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set their own prices not only directly but through Google itself, and are free 
to change that price at any time, whereas the   BMI   rightsholders retained 
no right to individually price and sell through the intermediary. Third, his 
diagrams ignore the fact that, while the   BMI   rightsholders could sell only 
through their intermediary, under the settlement rightsholders may sell 
through Google and its rival intermediaries at the same time.
        A more accurate depiction of the difference would thus be the following 
diagrams, which include the following four important differences from the 
prior diagrams. (1) The parallel lines from each rightsholder to Google rep-
resent their individual vertical decisions on whether to sell through Google. 
(2) The fact that the rightsholders’ parallel lines go through Google to buy-
ers represents the rightsholders’ ability to individually sell and set prices 
through Google, whereas in   BMI   the lines from the rightsholders stop at 
the intermediary, rather than going through it, because they had no right 
to individually sell and price through their intermediary. (3) The parallel 
lines between rightsholders and each potential Google rival reﬂ  ect the fact 
that rightsholders can sell through Google and its rivals at the same time, 
whereas in   BMI   the parallel lines link each rightsholder to either ASCAP 
or BMI but not both, representing the fact that each rightsholder could 
sell only through one intermediary. (4) The curved lines going from the 
rightsholders to the consumers depicts the fact that in both cases the right-
sholders retained a right to directly license users without going through an 
intermediary, which is worth stressing because the   BMI   courts held that 
this factor sufﬁ  ced to make the agreement there procompetitive. 
  Thus, Fraser entirely inverts the relationship between the Google set-
tlement and the   BMI   contracts. Far from forcing more cartel-like behav-
ior among rightsholders than in   BMI  , the settlement’s terms involve no 
Rival A Rival B
Rightsholders
Consumers
ASCAP BMI
Rightsholders
Consumers
Google
A More Accurate Depiction
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  horizontal agreement to form or join the intermediary. Those terms also 
enable the rightsholders to compete by selling individual copyrighted ma-
terial through the intermediary, setting prices for individual sales through 
the intermediary, and simultaneously selling that material through other 
intermediaries, all impossibilities in   BMI  .  In short,   BMI   not only shows 
that settlement critics are wrong when they assert the settlement here con-
stitutes per   se   illegal horizontal price-ﬁ  xing (Picker 2009c, 385; Fraser 2009, 
13–15), but also establishes that the settlement here cannot be judged to 
fail the rule of reason that the less procompetitive   BMI  blanket  licenses 
passed. 
 5.  CONCLUSION 
  Critics of the Google Books Settlement like to focus on what they call 
“orphan” books, meaning books I have been calling “unclaimed.” But the 
situation regarding such books brings to mind the old Oscar Wilde quote 
about orphans: “To lose one parent may be regarded as a misfortune; to 
lose both looks like carelessness.” Likewise, here, to be unable to ﬁ  nd a 
book’s rightholder is a misfortune, but to compound that misfortune by 
blocking a settlement that offers the best prospect for both ﬁ  nding those 
rightsholders and resurrecting their books if they cannot be found, would 
be sheer antitrust carelessness. The effects of the settlement on compe-
tition in orphan/unclaimed books is thus strongly positive, even more 
so when one considers that the settlement lowers barriers to rivals seek-
ing to offer those books and requires that Google price those books at 
 competitive  rates. 
  The effects on other categories of books are also strongly procom-
petitive. The settlement clariﬁ  es which books are in the public domain 
and makes them digitally available for free. The settlement also expands 
the output of claimed in-copyright books by clarifying who holds their 
rights, making them all digitally searchable, allowing individual digital 
display and sales at competitive prices that each rightsholder can set, and 
creating a new subscription product that provides digital access to a near-
universal library at free or competitive rates. The settlement does not raise 
rival barriers to offering any of these books, but to the contrary lowers 
them. The output expansion is particularly dramatic for commercially 
unavailable books, for which by deﬁ  nition there would otherwise be no 
new output at all. 
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